Investigation of Voting Systems for the WPI Faculty by Murvihill, Dolan Patrick et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
April 2013









Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Murvihill, D. P., Smestad, D. R., Fogel, L. A., & Heon, M. R. (2013). Investigation of Voting Systems for the WPI Faculty. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/1262
	  	  	  	  	  
Investigation	  of	  Voting	  Systems	  for	  the	  WPI	  Faculty	  





Abstract	  The	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  tasked	  the	  team	  with	  examining	  options	  for	  moving	  the	  election	  process	  for	  faculty	  committees	  to	  a	  web-­‐based,	  electronic	  system	  to	  simplify	  the	  counting	  process.	  We	  identified	  issues	  important	  to	  voting	  in	  small	  community	  elections,	  paying	  special	  attention	  to	  WPI’s	  specific	  requirements.	  Using	  that	  knowledge,	  we	  created	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  a	  proposed	  system's	  suitability	  for	  WPI	  faculty	  elections.	  Using	  the	  results	  of	  these	  evaluations	  we	  provide	  concrete	  steps	  to	  improve	  faculty	  elections.	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Executive	  Summary	  Faculty	  elections	  at	  WPI	  are	  currently	  conducted	  with	  paper	  ballots	  that	  are	  sent	  through	  intra-­‐campus	  mail	  and	  painstakingly	  hand	  counted.	  This	  creates	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  paper	  waste	  and	  takes	  election	  officials	  hours	  or	  even	  days	  to	  count.	  The	  use	  of	  intra-­‐campus	  mail	  makes	  it	  difficult	  (and	  sometimes	  impossible)	  for	  faculty	  members	  who	  are	  off	  campus	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot.	  Even	  when	  off-­‐campus	  faculty	  can	  vote,	  the	  privacy	  of	  their	  vote	  is	  compromised	  because	  they	  must	  send	  their	  ballot	  via	  e-­‐mail	  to	  the	  Faculty	  Governance	  Coordinator.	  Finally,	  because	  the	  ranked	  voting	  system	  used	  by	  the	  faculty	  is	  complex,	  several	  ballots	  are	  found	  to	  be	  invalid	  and	  thrown	  out	  in	  each	  election.	  Because	  of	  these	  issues,	  faculty	  government	  previously	  attempted	  to	  replace	  the	  paper	  system	  with	  an	  electronic	  one;	  that	  attempt	  failed	  because	  faculty	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  security	  and	  maintainability	  of	  such	  a	  system.	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  implications	  of	  moving	  faculty	  elections	  to	  an	  electronic	  system	  and	  provides	  the	  faculty	  with	  a	  recommendation	  for	  a	  course	  of	  action	  to	  make	  lasting	  improvements	  to	  faculty	  elections.	  





improvements,	  alongside	  many	  other	  features	  only	  possible	  with	  a	  redesign	  of	  the	  voting	  system,	  provide	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  the	  faculty	  to	  change	  the	  way	  elections	  are	  conducted.	  
With	  that	  being	  said,	  electronic	  elections	  are	  not	  without	  their	  challenges.	  The	  real	  and	  perceived	  threat	  of	  attacks	  on	  the	  elections	  is	  increased	  in	  an	  electronic	  system.	  A	  properly	  secure	  election	  system	  should	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  its	  voters	  with	  assurances	  as	  to	  their	  privacy,	  the	  integrity	  of	  election	  results,	  and	  the	  eligibility	  of	  all	  participants.	  Keeping	  the	  votes	  of	  faculty	  members	  private	  is	  especially	  critical	  because	  of	  the	  social	  implications	  of	  voter	  identities	  being	  disclosed.	  Ensuring	  that	  all	  votes	  are	  cast	  by	  eligible	  voters	  and	  that	  their	  votes	  are	  accurately	  reflected	  in	  the	  results	  is	  also	  important	  however,	  because	  otherwise	  the	  election	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  true	  representation	  of	  the	  opinions	  of	  voters.	  Solving	  these	  problems	  is	  not	  only	  necessary	  for	  creating	  a	  good	  voting	  system,	  but	  also	  for	  building	  trust	  in	  a	  system	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  face	  challenges	  from	  faculty	  members	  skeptical	  of	  its	  trustworthiness.	  





reason	  for	  this	  discrepancy	  may	  be	  the	  40%	  of	  respondents	  who	  reported	  they	  had	  not	  voted	  in	  at	  least	  one	  election	  because	  it	  was	  inconvenient.	  The	  survey	  also	  indicated	  strong	  support	  for	  changing	  the	  voting	  system;	  84%	  of	  faculty	  supported	  this	  change.	  Additionally,	  the	  team	  performed	  a	  usability	  experiment	  which	  had	  promising	  results	  for	  the	  voting	  interfaces	  the	  team	  designed.	  
The	  team	  used	  all	  information	  gathered	  to	  develop	  and	  refine	  a	  set	  of	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  voting	  systems.	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  criteria	  was	  to	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  a	  faculty	  voting	  system	  for	  WPI.	  These	  requirements	  could	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  a	  system	  to	  determine	  its	  suitability	  for	  use	  at	  WPI,	  or	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  system.	  These	  criteria	  were	  divided	  into	  four	  parts,	  each	  representing	  an	  important	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  a	  voting	  system:	  Security,	  Trust,	  Usability,	  and	  Institutional	  Requirements	  (representing	  the	  unique	  needs	  of	  WPI	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  another	  category).	  The	  criteria	  were	  also	  ranked	  in	  terms	  of	  relative	  importance	  to	  a	  voting	  system	  at	  WPI,	  from	  required	  criteria	  (mandatory	  for	  a	  system	  to	  be	  successful)	  to	  advantageous	  criteria	  (things	  that	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  have	  in	  a	  system,	  but	  are	  not	  particularly	  important	  to	  its	  success).	  The	  criteria	  themselves	  are	  available	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  paper.	  





were	  most	  promising	  for	  use	  at	  WPI	  were	  also	  the	  ones	  that	  would	  require	  the	  most	  modification	  to	  use.	  





1.	  Introduction	  The	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  (COG)	  of	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  has	  asked	  an	  Interactive	  Qualifying	  Project	  team	  to	  examine	  the	  possibility	  of	  building	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  for	  use	  in	  the	  faculty	  committee	  elections.	  The	  team	  worked	  for	  fourteen	  weeks	  to	  study	  the	  options	  and	  develop	  a	  recommendation	  for	  how	  to	  proceed.	  This	  paper	  documents	  the	  process	  and	  the	  results	  of	  that	  study,	  and	  presents	  the	  team’s	  finding	  to	  the	  COG,	  along	  with	  recommendations	  for	  how	  to	  move	  forward.	  
The	  Faculty	  is	  responsible	  for	  advising	  policy	  on	  degree	  requirements,	  courses,	  and	  recommending	  students	  for	  graduation.	  The	  Faculty	  also	  advises	  decisions	  on	  the	  university	  policy	  and	  budgets	  through	  the	  Committee	  on	  Administrative	  and	  Financial	  Policy	  (FAP),	  and	  has	  a	  major	  role	  in	  appointing,	  promoting,	  and	  recommending	  tenure	  for	  faculty	  members	  through	  the	  Committee	  on	  Tenure	  and	  Academic	  Freedom	  (CTAF).	  The	  Faculty’s	  powerful	  role	  in	  academics,	  admissions,	  finance,	  instructor	  appointment,	  and	  student	  life	  makes	  its	  elections	  very	  important	  to	  the	  entire	  WPI	  community.	  
For	  the	  details	  of	  its	  business,	  the	  faculty	  relies	  on	  eight	  standing	  committees;	  in	  some	  cases,	  as	  in	  making	  recommendations	  for	  granting	  tenure,	  the	  standing	  committees	  are	  able	  to	  act	  on	  their	  own.	  Other	  times,	  the	  committees	  can	  only	  make	  recommendations	  to	  the	  general	  faculty.	  The	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  (COG)	  also	  has	  the	  power	  to	  create	  ad-­‐hoc	  committees	  as	  necessary.	  The	  president	  and	  the	  provost	  of	  the	  university	  are	  granted	  ex	  





Currently,	  faculty	  members	  vote	  on	  paper	  ballots	  submitted	  through	  the	  WPI	  intra-­‐campus	  mail	  system.	  The	  election	  is	  a	  two-­‐step	  process	  with	  a	  nominating	  ballot	  followed	  by	  an	  electing	  ballot.	  The	  faculty	  members	  receive	  in	  their	  mailboxes	  an	  anonymous	  green	  envelope	  with	  a	  nominating	  ballot.	  The	  ballot	  contains	  a	  list	  of	  faculty	  members	  and	  the	  committees	  they	  are	  eligible	  to	  sit	  on.	  Voters	  nominate	  candidates	  for	  each	  committee	  by	  circling	  the	  name	  of	  the	  candidate	  and	  sending	  the	  ballot	  in	  its	  green	  envelope	  to	  the	  faculty	  governance	  coordinator.	  Voters	  then	  receive	  another	  ballot	  (the	  electing	  ballot)	  used	  for	  the	  final	  election	  of	  committees.	  For	  each	  committee,	  faculty	  members	  rank	  their	  preferred	  candidates	  by	  writing	  numbers	  next	  to	  their	  names	  on	  the	  ballot.	  They	  then	  send	  the	  electing	  ballot	  back	  in	  the	  green	  envelope	  to	  the	  faculty	  governance	  coordinator.	  Off-­‐campus	  faculty	  members	  must	  send	  in	  their	  nominating	  and	  electing	  ballots	  by	  e-­‐mail.	  





The	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  has	  commissioned	  a	  study	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  moving	  to	  electronic	  voting	  because	  it	  believes	  electronic	  voting	  could	  repair	  some	  problems	  inherent	  to	  voting	  on	  paper	  ballots.	  First,	  counting	  ballots	  is	  an	  extremely	  cumbersome	  process	  that	  takes	  far	  too	  long;	  the	  faculty	  governance	  coordinator	  and	  COG	  have	  to	  tally	  votes	  for	  days	  to	  find	  a	  result.	  Second,	  the	  current	  vote-­‐by-­‐mail	  system	  provides	  no	  way	  to	  authenticate	  a	  voter	  at	  the	  time	  the	  ballot	  is	  cast;	  as	  a	  result,	  people	  who	  are	  unenfranchised	  but	  manage	  to	  obtain	  a	  ballot	  can	  vote,	  and	  some	  legitimate	  voters	  can	  easily	  vote	  more	  than	  once.	  Third,	  off-­‐campus	  faculty	  members	  may	  not	  cast	  an	  anonymous	  ballot,	  which	  compromises	  their	  privacy.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  fix	  incorrect	  ballots;	  voters	  who	  fill	  out	  their	  ballot	  incorrectly	  simply	  have	  their	  vote	  thrown	  away.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  whom	  the	  ballot	  belongs	  to,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  notify	  the	  voter	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  not	  counted.	  Without	  this	  feedback,	  people	  might	  inadvertently	  develop	  a	  habit	  of	  submitting	  incorrect	  ballots	  -­‐	  those	  voters	  are	  unwittingly	  disenfranchised.	  





faculty.	  These	  requirements	  served	  to	  guide	  the	  team	  in	  its	  exploration	  of	  options	  for	  faculty	  elections.	  
The	  team	  began	  its	  exploration	  by	  gathering	  information	  on	  electronic	  voting	  in	  general	  and	  about	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  in	  particular.	  The	  team	  took	  a	  three-­‐pronged	  approach:	  gathering	  expert	  information	  on	  electronic	  voting	  by	  reading	  existing	  security,	  usability,	  and	  political	  science	  research	  in	  the	  field;	  gathering	  information	  about	  the	  wants	  and	  concerns	  of	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  by	  sending	  out	  a	  poll	  and	  interviewing	  voters	  and	  election	  officials;	  and	  gathering	  information	  about	  the	  particular	  institutional	  and	  technical	  requirements	  at	  WPI	  by	  interviewing	  IT	  staff	  members	  and	  the	  COG.	  The	  team	  used	  this	  information	  to	  determine	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  system,	  which	  they	  distilled	  into	  a	  set	  of	  
evaluation	  criteria.	  The	  evaluation	  criteria	  are	  features	  the	  team	  feels	  are	  crucial	  to	  any	  voting	  application	  on	  campus,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  features	  that	  make	  a	  voting	  system	  more	  attractive.	  They	  serve	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  team	  to	  evaluate	  existing	  systems,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  roadmap	  for	  anyone	  designing	  a	  new	  system	  from	  scratch.	  The	  evaluation	  criteria	  come	  with	  a	  scorecard	  that	  provides	  an	  at-­‐a-­‐glance	  view	  of	  how	  suitable	  a	  system	  is	  and	  how	  it	  compares	  to	  other	  systems.	  










2.	  Literature	  Review	  Identifying	  key	  nuances	  in	  the	  design	  of	  electronic	  voting	  systems	  is	  critical	  to	  selecting	  a	  course	  of	  action	  for	  WPI.	  Increasingly,	  researchers	  now	  believe	  that	  moving	  to	  electronic	  elections	  is	  a	  good	  idea:	  potential	  benefits	  include	  savings	  in	  both	  time	  and	  money,	  along	  with	  increases	  in	  voter	  turnout	  due	  to	  increased	  convenience	  (Volkamer	  et	  al.	  2011,	  1).	  However,	  electronic	  elections	  are	  often	  viewed	  as	  too	  problematic	  for	  practical	  consideration	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  2).	  To	  get	  the	  full	  picture,	  the	  team	  set	  out	  to	  identify	  specific	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  in	  electronic	  elections	  by	  studying	  existing	  work	  on	  the	  topic.	  Identifying	  prior	  research	  into	  electronic	  elections,	  especially	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  university	  elections,	  is	  very	  important	  to	  support	  any	  recommendation	  made	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Governance,	  or	  the	  Faculty	  as	  a	  whole.	  





inclined,	  and	  a	  voting	  system	  with	  a	  complicated	  or	  difficult	  user	  interface	  could	  be	  a	  huge	  step	  back	  from	  paper	  and	  pencil	  in	  terms	  of	  participation	  and	  user	  experience;	  conversely,	  the	  presence	  of	  computers	  provides	  exciting	  opportunities	  to	  make	  ballots	  less	  confusing	  and	  more	  informative.	  Electronic	  elections	  raise	  three	  serious	  issues	  that	  are	  nontrivial	  to	  solve	  and	  deeply	  intertwined:	  security,	  trust,	  and	  usability.	  The	  team’s	  main	  objective	  when	  performing	  research	  was	  to	  identify	  technical	  features	  and	  policy	  details	  that	  maximize	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system’s	  performance	  in	  each	  of	  these	  three	  areas.	  The	  research	  helped	  the	  team	  develop	  deep	  knowledge	  about	  these	  issues	  and	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  design	  of	  the	  evaluation	  criteria.	  
Most	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  electronic	  elections	  revolves	  around	  national-­‐scale	  elections,	  while	  much	  less	  discusses	  small-­‐scale	  elections	  like	  those	  of	  a	  faculty.	  A	  number	  of	  issues	  in	  national	  elections	  become	  significantly	  less	  important	  in	  small	  elections;	  conversely,	  some	  things	  that	  are	  unimportant	  in	  large-­‐scale	  elections	  become	  paramount	  in	  a	  university	  setting.	  By	  being	  aware	  of	  these	  similarities	  and	  differences,	  the	  team	  was	  able	  to	  derive	  useful	  information	  from	  the	  literature	  while	  avoiding	  false	  comparisons.	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  differences,	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  elections	  and	  large-­‐scale	  elections	  share	  much	  in	  common.	  The	  same	  issues	  exist	  in	  both:	  voters	  still	  care	  about	  vote-­‐privacy,	  the	  system	  must	  be	  secure	  against	  election	  fraud,	  etc.	  The	  differences	  between	  small	  and	  large	  elections	  are,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  in	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  these	  issues.	  





small	  elections	  agree	  "Loss	  of	  anonymity,	  bribery,	  and	  coercion	  are	  more	  serious	  issues	  in	  small-­‐scale	  voting	  than	  in	  large-­‐scale	  voting"	  (Endo	  et	  al,	  1287).	  In	  small	  elections	  (particularly	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  elections),	  the	  results	  of	  the	  election	  typically	  have	  more	  direct	  impacts	  on	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  the	  voters.	  By	  identifying	  ways	  in	  which	  different	  types	  of	  elections	  are	  analogous,	  the	  team	  was	  able	  to	  put	  the	  research	  in	  context	  and	  gain	  a	  much	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  security,	  trust,	  and	  usability	  in	  small-­‐scale	  elections.	  
2.1.	  Security	  Issues	  and	  Solutions	  Security	  researchers	  typically	  identify	  three	  properties	  that	  comprise	  security:	  privacy,	  integrity,	  and	  authenticity.	  The	  foundation	  for	  the	  team’s	  approach	  to	  evaluating	  voting	  system	  security	  was	  identifying	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  properties.	  In	  this	  case,	  privacy	  means	  no	  person	  can	  gain	  information	  about	  how	  another	  person	  cast	  his	  or	  her	  vote.	  Integrity	  means	  all	  votes	  cast	  are	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly,	  and	  the	  election	  result	  is	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  votes	  that	  were	  cast.	  Authenticity	  means	  all	  eligible	  people	  are	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  vote,	  only	  eligible	  people	  vote,	  and	  no	  person	  votes	  more	  times	  than	  he	  or	  she	  is	  allowed.	  To	  ensure	  legitimate	  results,	  each	  election	  must	  meet	  baseline	  requirements	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  categories.	  The	  team’s	  major	  challenge	  while	  gathering	  information	  on	  security	  was	  identifying	  the	  baselines.	  





arguably	  even	  more	  important	  than	  ensuring	  a	  fair	  election	  because	  while	  privacy	  breaches	  might	  seem	  unlikely	  in	  WPI	  faculty	  elections,	  the	  implications	  are	  too	  severe	  to	  ignore.	  Most	  voters	  know	  one	  another,	  and	  election	  outcomes	  more	  directly	  affect	  them.	  Even	  if	  privacy	  failures	  do	  not	  cause	  problems	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  election,	  a	  breach	  could	  damage	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  severely	  affect	  the	  WPI	  community.	  	  
There	  are	  three	  places	  an	  attacker	  could	  violate	  the	  privacy	  of	  an	  election:	  at	  the	  server	  hosting	  the	  voting,	  at	  the	  devices	  participating	  in	  voting,	  and	  at	  the	  connection	  between.	  Any	  election	  security	  system	  must	  provide	  secrecy	  at	  all	  three	  locations	  (Jefferson	  2004).	  Vote-­‐privacy,	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  voting	  system	  to	  prevent	  a	  voter’s	  ballot	  from	  being	  linked	  with	  their	  identity,	  is	  a	  critical	  feature	  of	  electronic	  voting	  systems,	  particularly	  for	  small	  elections.	  In	  fact,	  researchers	  recommend	  small	  elections	  guarantee	  coercion	  resistance,	  a	  property	  that	  prevents	  a	  voter	  under	  duress	  from	  cooperating	  with	  a	  coercer	  to	  prove	  he	  voted	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  13).	  Elections	  are	  of	  limited	  meaning	  without	  assurances	  that	  malicious	  parties	  cannot	  influence	  the	  results,	  and	  thus	  preventing	  coercion	  of	  voters	  is	  important	  to	  democratic	  elections.	  In	  small	  elections	  voter	  intimidation,	  coercion,	  and	  bribery	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  influence	  the	  result	  of	  an	  election	  (Endo	  et.	  al	  2008,	  1287).	  





SSL/TLS,	  the	  protocol	  used	  for	  secure	  connections	  on	  the	  web	  (along	  with	  other	  internet	  applications).	  Researchers	  have	  developed	  systems	  that	  have	  been	  mathematically	  proven	  to	  prevent	  voter-­‐coercion	  (Juels	  et.	  al.	  2005,	  4).	  These	  systems	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  “anonymous	  credentials”	  which	  cannot	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  voter.	  This	  scheme	  allows	  authenticity	  without	  compromising	  secrecy.	  The	  idea	  of	  separating	  voter-­‐identifying	  information	  from	  the	  ballot	  is	  critical	  to	  ensuring	  vote-­‐privacy.	  A	  simpler	  way	  of	  doing	  this	  is	  storing	  voter	  identifiable	  information	  in	  the	  database	  unencrypted,	  but	  separately	  from	  ballots;	  this	  ensures	  privacy	  except	  against	  an	  extremely	  determined	  and	  technically	  competent	  attacker.	  Such	  methods	  could	  help	  alleviate	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  issue	  of	  voter	  coercion	  in	  small	  elections,	  like	  those	  that	  are	  conducted	  at	  WPI.	  





The	  current	  system’s	  lack	  of	  authentication	  on	  the	  ballot	  itself	  (though	  the	  ballots	  are	  only	  sent	  to	  authenticated	  voters)	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  an	  attempt	  at	  so-­‐called	  “anonymity	  by	  obscurity”	  but	  the	  privacy	  of	  voters	  in	  an	  electronic	  system	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  compromised	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  an	  authentication	  system,	  should	  the	  methods	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  on	  Privacy	  be	  observed.	  Failing	  to	  authenticate	  users	  in	  faculty	  elections	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  determine	  their	  eligibility	  to	  vote,	  and	  could	  allow	  people	  to	  vote	  multiple	  times.	  Additionally,	  it	  may	  not	  stop	  unenfranchised	  parties	  from	  voting.	  In	  the	  current	  system,	  a	  malicious	  party	  would	  need	  to	  forge	  a	  ballot	  and	  specially	  printed	  envelope	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot;	  in	  an	  electronic	  system	  without	  authentication	  they	  would	  simply	  need	  to	  click	  the	  submit	  button	  (presuming	  they	  had	  the	  URL	  for	  a	  ballot,	  which	  could	  be	  gained	  from	  a	  voting	  faculty	  member’s	  computer	  or	  email).	  Luckily,	  this	  problem	  can	  be	  easily	  solved	  in	  ways	  that	  actually	  provide	  more	  security	  than	  the	  current	  system.	  





et.	  al.	  2009,	  4).	  Other	  identity	  verification	  measures	  could	  include	  entering	  one’s	  ID	  number	  or	  birthday.	  If	  the	  system	  failed	  to	  authenticate	  voters	  it	  would	  be	  susceptible	  to	  manipulation	  by	  malicious	  users	  casting	  multiple	  votes	  or	  by	  unenfranchised	  parties	  casting	  illegal	  votes.	  This	  could	  even	  happen	  if	  a	  voter	  accidentally	  voted	  improperly.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  illegal	  voter,	  failing	  to	  prevent	  these	  votes	  would	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  electoral	  process.	  Authenticating	  voters	  with	  unique	  identifying	  information	  would	  solve	  this	  problem	  with	  few,	  if	  any,	  disadvantages.	  





results	  of	  the	  election	  are	  disputed	  or	  other	  circumstances	  requiring	  their	  examination	  arise.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  the	  database	  safe	  by	  establishing	  rules	  and	  procedures	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  election	  data.	  It	  would	  be	  unfortunate	  if	  a	  WPI	  election	  system	  fell	  victim	  to	  the	  same	  issue	  that	  plagued	  a	  British	  electronic	  election	  system,	  where	  an	  administrator	  distributed	  his	  (all-­‐access)	  username	  and	  password	  to	  all	  election	  officials,	  leaving	  their	  databases	  to	  be	  easily	  modified	  by	  system	  administrators	  after	  the	  election,	  eliminating	  the	  chance	  for	  any	  auditing	  of	  access	  to	  stored	  votes	  (Xenakis	  2004).	  A	  system	  designed	  with	  these	  issues	  in	  mind	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  mitigating	  them.	  





received	  (one	  code	  per	  task).	  The	  major	  disadvantage	  of	  code	  voting	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  voting	  more	  difficult	  because	  the	  codes	  are	  not	  obviously	  connected	  to	  their	  corresponding	  actions.	  When	  code	  voting	  is	  used	  specifically	  to	  prevent	  attacks	  through	  malicious	  programs	  on	  a	  voter’s	  computer,	  the	  codes	  can	  be	  delivered	  through	  captchas,	  which	  most	  Internet	  users	  are	  familiar	  with	  (Oppliger	  et	  al	  2008,	  224).	  Code	  voting,	  as	  well	  as	  cryptographically	  secured	  connections	  should	  be	  considered	  for	  inclusion	  in	  electronic	  voting	  systems,	  as	  they	  promote	  integrity.	  
2.4.1.	  Auditing	  in	  Voting	  Even	  when	  the	  designers	  of	  an	  election	  system	  are	  careful	  to	  prevent	  security	  breaches	  that	  could	  compromise	  integrity,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  system	  is	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  integrity	  with	  each	  election	  (Sandler	  2009,	  12).	  In	  most	  cases,	  auditing	  election	  results	  can	  assure	  the	  integrity	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  elections.	  Auditing	  is	  the	  process	  of	  verifying	  the	  integrity	  of	  election	  results	  after	  the	  election	  has	  been	  conducted.	  Depending	  on	  the	  method,	  auditing	  can	  be	  done	  by	  election	  officials,	  by	  voters,	  or	  by	  the	  general	  public.	  Auditors	  can	  verify	  that	  ballots	  were	  collected,	  handled,	  and	  counted	  correctly,	  or	  that	  only	  authorized	  voters	  actually	  cast	  ballots,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  those	  properties.	  When	  used	  effectively,	  auditing	  can	  guarantee	  the	  integrity	  and	  authenticity	  as	  well	  as	  increasing	  users’	  trust	  in	  the	  election	  system	  (Adida	  2008,	  345).	  





individual	  votes	  by	  the	  voters	  who	  cast	  them.	  Individual	  verifiability	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  gaining	  voter	  trust	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  user	  to	  obtain	  proof	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  interpreted	  correctly	  (provided	  they	  trust	  and	  understand	  the	  verification	  mechanism).	  	  Verification	  mechanisms	  help	  to	  alleviate	  the	  feeling	  that	  voters	  must	  place	  blind	  trust	  in	  the	  system	  (Adida	  2008,	  345).	  Individual	  verifiability	  can	  be	  very	  easy	  to	  implement,	  and	  can	  even	  be	  done	  without	  compromising	  the	  property	  of	  receipt	  freeness	  using	  cryptographic	  hash	  functions	  (although	  this	  makes	  it	  harder	  for	  users	  to	  understand).	  Such	  hashes	  provide	  the	  user	  with	  a	  receipt	  that	  uniquely	  identifies	  their	  vote,	  but	  cannot	  be	  easily	  used	  to	  identify	  whom	  they	  voted	  for	  (Adida	  2008,	  345).	  This	  would	  require	  the	  user	  to	  remember	  a	  hash	  (a	  seemingly	  random	  series	  of	  characters	  of	  significant	  length)	  which	  could	  be	  inputted	  into	  the	  system	  to	  verify	  their	  vote.	  Distributing	  these	  receipts	  via	  email	  would	  partially	  solve	  the	  issue	  of	  remembering	  them,	  but	  these	  emails	  could	  still	  be	  lost	  or	  deleted,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  voter	  would	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  verify	  their	  ballot.	  





to	  verify	  that	  election	  results	  were	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  without	  compromising	  voter	  secrecy	  (Adida	  2008,	  335).	  Researchers	  have	  developed	  systems	  with	  this	  property	  for	  use	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  and	  they	  have	  even	  been	  tested	  within	  the	  context	  of	  university	  elections	  (Adida	  et	  al	  2009,	  1).	  The	  researchers	  responsible	  for	  such	  a	  test	  freely	  admit	  “Even	  voting	  experts	  who	  recognize	  that	  open-­‐audit	  elections	  are	  ‘the	  way	  we’ll	  all	  vote	  in	  the	  future’	  seem	  to	  envision	  a	  very	  distant	  future,	  not	  one	  we	  should	  consider	  for	  practical	  purposes	  yet”(Adida	  et	  al	  2009,	  1).	  However,	  because	  tested	  software	  already	  exists	  that	  includes	  these	  features,	  WPI	  could	  consider	  it	  for	  faculty	  elections	  because	  it	  comes	  at	  no	  cost	  and	  makes	  elections	  more	  verifiably	  correct.	  
2.5.	  Current	  and	  Former	  Systems	  





assurances	  (individual	  and	  universal	  verifiability)	  form	  the	  core	  of	  Helios'	  design	  paradigm	  (Adida	  2008,	  335).	  This	  provides	  assurance	  of	  an	  election	  free	  of	  fraud	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  additional	  complexity.	  Systems	  like	  Helios	  often	  assume	  that	  the	  candidates	  can	  hire	  or	  enlist	  a	  trusted	  person	  to	  verify	  election	  results,	  making	  the	  extra	  complexity	  justifiable.	  
Helios	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  successful	  Internet	  voting	  system.	  Its	  success	  stems,	  in	  part,	  from	  its	  proven	  security;	  the	  novel	  implementation	  of	  open-­‐audit	  voting	  is	  a	  boon	  for	  organizers	  facing	  voters	  who	  may	  have	  reservations	  about	  the	  integrity	  of	  elections	  conducted	  online	  (Adida	  2008,	  335).	  Another	  critical	  aspect	  of	  Helios	  is	  its	  well-­‐defined	  limited	  scope;	  the	  creators	  make	  no	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  coercion	  resistance	  properties	  of	  the	  election	  system	  (though	  they	  do	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  coercion),	  an	  openness	  that	  allows	  election	  organizers	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  that	  particular	  property	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  2).	  Finally,	  Helios	  has	  already	  been	  proven	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  elections	  it	  was	  designed	  for	  without	  any	  serious	  issues	  arising	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  1).	  The	  system	  has	  already	  been	  used	  to	  conduct	  campus	  elections,	  for	  example	  at	  Belgium's	  Université	  Catholique	  de	  Louvain	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  1)	  and	  Princeton	  University.	  	  





avoid	  dependence	  on	  voter	  hardware	  and	  software,	  although	  some	  browsers	  were	  not	  supported.	  The	  system	  was	  discarded	  for	  security	  reasons	  –	  a	  report	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  system	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  describes	  Internet	  voting	  systems	  as	  having	  “fundamental	  security	  problems”	  which	  cannot	  easily	  be	  remedied,	  as	  they	  are	  “fundamental	  in	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  of	  the	  PC	  hardware	  and	  software	  that	  is	  ubiquitous	  today”	  (Jefferson	  2004,	  2).	  
A	  security	  review	  of	  the	  proposed	  SERVE	  system	  showed	  that	  it	  was	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  prevent	  vote	  fraud	  in	  such	  a	  system.	  The	  many	  potential	  vectors	  of	  attack	  on	  Internet	  voting	  systems	  are	  part	  of	  the	  problem;	  the	  PC	  that	  is	  being	  used	  to	  vote,	  the	  secure	  connection	  between	  servers	  and	  the	  user,	  and	  the	  servers	  themselves	  are	  all	  targets	  for	  attack.	  While	  existing	  security	  solutions	  are	  adequate	  for	  e-­‐commerce	  and	  electronic	  purchasing,	  they	  are	  insufficient	  to	  adequately	  secure	  national	  elections.	  The	  security	  requirements	  are	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  secret	  ballot	  –	  the	  anonymity	  of	  data	  collected	  by	  such	  a	  voting	  system	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  detect	  intrusion	  or	  fraud	  of	  votes.	  Finally,	  the	  existing	  local	  voting	  system	  is	  highly	  decentralized,	  ensuring	  that	  any	  attacker	  who	  wanted	  to	  significantly	  alter	  an	  election	  would	  have	  to	  compromise	  numerous	  different	  voting	  stations,	  whereas	  if	  a	  centralized	  internet	  voting	  system	  were	  compromised,	  the	  entire	  election's	  results	  could	  be	  easily	  altered	  (Jefferson	  2004).	  	  





compromise	  the	  entire	  election,	  for	  example,	  is	  dubious	  in	  small	  elections	  and	  exists	  in	  the	  current	  system.	  Still,	  the	  consideration	  that	  anonymity	  makes	  security	  and	  accountability	  difficult	  remains;	  voting	  systems	  are,	  by	  necessity,	  a	  study	  in	  compromise	  (Jefferson	  2004).	  
2.6.	  Voter	  Trust	  Building	  a	  secure	  system	  is	  obviously	  an	  important	  consideration	  when	  moving	  the	  faculty	  to	  e-­‐voting,	  but	  security	  alone	  is	  hardly	  enough	  to	  ensure	  acceptance.	  A	  new	  voting	  system	  will	  need	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  voters	  before	  it	  can	  be	  implemented.	  The	  system	  will	  not	  be	  adopted,	  nor	  will	  it	  survive	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  using	  it	  do	  not	  trust	  it.	  Electronic	  voting	  systems,	  unlike	  paper	  balloting	  systems,	  are	  more	  difficult	  for	  voters	  to	  understand.	  As	  a	  result,	  voters	  must	  place	  some	  trust	  in	  the	  organizers	  of	  the	  election	  and	  the	  technical	  experts	  designing	  the	  system	  unless	  they	  themselves	  are	  experts	  (Oostveen	  2005,	  305).	  As	  those	  involved	  in	  an	  ill-­‐fated	  voting	  machine	  project	  can	  attest,	  	  





Election	  designers	  must	  be	  careful	  to	  create	  a	  system	  that	  is	  actually	  trustworthy,	  for	  voters	  can	  trust	  a	  system	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  build	  trust	  among	  voters	  in	  a	  voting	  system	  with	  poor	  security;	  that	  strategy,	  besides	  being	  disingenuous	  and	  unethical,	  would	  fail	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Systems	  that	  are	  already	  in	  place	  face	  less	  skepticism	  because	  they	  seem	  to	  already	  be	  “proven”,	  regardless	  of	  their	  actual	  merit.	  This	  so-­‐called	  “trust	  based	  on	  unawareness”	  creates	  a	  dangerous	  situation	  where	  unrecognized	  vulnerabilities	  undermine	  the	  electoral	  process	  and	  voter	  confidence	  in	  the	  system.	  Security	  compromises	  can	  also	  erase	  confidence	  in	  administrators,	  which	  is	  even	  more	  disastrous	  than	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  system	  itself	  (Volkamer	  2011,	  1).	  Because	  electronic	  voting	  systems	  require	  more	  technical	  expertise	  to	  understand	  than	  their	  paper-­‐based	  counterparts,	  getting	  users	  to	  trust	  e-­‐voting	  will	  always	  require	  them	  to	  put	  some	  trust	  in	  the	  designers	  of	  the	  system	  (Oostveen	  2005,	  305).	  The	  increased	  technical	  barrier	  puts	  the	  onus	  on	  the	  designer	  to	  make	  the	  system	  both	  secure	  and	  understandable.	  Failing	  to	  provide	  these	  properties	  creates	  a	  dangerous	  potential	  for	  distrust.	  





to	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  it	  in	  a	  relaxed	  setting	  (Adida	  2009,	  11).	  They	  can	  also	  identify	  any	  issues	  that	  might	  cause	  a	  loss	  of	  trust	  before	  an	  actual	  election,	  so	  that	  they	  may	  be	  remedied	  before	  they	  have	  actual	  negative	  effects.	  
2.6.1.	  Establishing	  Trust	  The	  key	  to	  establishing	  lasting,	  well-­‐founded	  trust	  in	  an	  election	  system	  is	  transparency	  (Volkamer	  2011,	  2).	  Lasting	  trust	  occurs	  when	  voters	  understand	  the	  security	  features	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  system	  and	  have	  realistic	  expectations.	  Providing	  transparency	  leverages	  the	  actual	  security	  benefits	  of	  the	  system	  -­‐	  with	  high	  transparency,	  a	  well-­‐designed	  system	  is	  its	  own	  advocate.	  The	  other	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  system	  does	  not	  receive	  undue	  trust	  from	  complacent	  voters;	  it	  must	  be	  good	  enough	  to	  withstand	  scrutiny	  even	  if	  it	  receives	  none.	  





showing	  a	  coercer	  they	  vote	  they	  are	  looking	  for.	  The	  use	  of	  vote	  updating	  for	  these	  purposes	  has	  been	  studied	  in	  real-­‐world	  university	  elections	  to	  increase	  voter	  confidence	  in	  new	  electronic	  systems	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  9).	  In	  elections	  conducted	  at	  the	  Université	  Catholique	  de	  Louvain	  (UCL)	  in	  Louvain-­‐la-­‐Neuve,	  Belgian	  researchers	  found	  that	  the	  feature	  was	  used	  by	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  voters	  but	  concluded	  that	  it’s	  presence	  increased	  voter	  trust	  in	  the	  new	  system	  (Adida	  et.	  al.	  2009,	  12).	  The	  security	  and	  usability	  that	  vote	  updating	  provides	  is	  transparent	  to	  users	  which	  makes	  it	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  making	  voters	  more	  comfortable	  with	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  (Volkamer	  2011,	  2).	  
Finally,	  electronic	  voting	  opens	  up	  the	  potential	  for	  voting	  interfaces	  that	  could	  potentially	  be	  easier	  to	  use,	  which	  would	  increase	  trust.	  Security	  features	  are	  important	  to	  designing	  a	  trusted	  voting	  system,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  consideration.	  Researchers	  have	  found	  that	  voters	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  vote	  if	  they	  do	  not	  trust	  their	  own	  technical	  abilities	  (Volkamer	  2011,	  1).	  Voters	  are	  unlikely	  to	  support	  or	  use	  a	  voting	  system	  that	  they	  can	  not	  figure	  out.	  Failing	  to	  capture	  a	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  because	  users	  distrust	  the	  usability	  of	  the	  system	  is	  a	  catastrophic	  failure.	  It	  is	  therefore	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  designers	  of	  the	  system	  to	  ensure	  that	  voters	  are	  capable	  of	  voting	  correctly	  with	  minimal	  instruction.	  





is	  obvious;	  elections	  are	  held	  to	  let	  voters	  make	  decisions	  and	  if	  a	  voting	  system	  can	  not	  accurately	  express	  the	  opinions	  of	  voters	  it	  has	  no	  purpose.	  A	  usable	  voting	  system	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  efficient	  in	  collecting	  votes;	  if	  the	  process	  cannot	  be	  performed	  quickly	  and	  without	  undue	  difficulty,	  the	  individual	  cost	  of	  voting	  will	  outweigh	  the	  benefits;	  this	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “The	  Paradox	  of	  Voting”.	  If	  voters	  are	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  system,	  that	  is,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  it	  has	  effectively	  or	  efficiently	  recorded	  their	  vote	  then	  the	  system	  has	  also	  failed	  (Everett	  2006,	  2547).	  Because	  elections	  are	  pointless	  without	  voters,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  voters	  are	  able	  to	  use	  the	  voting	  system,	  and	  use	  it	  correctly,	  should	  be	  the	  first	  priority	  in	  designing	  any	  election	  system.	  





understand	  ballot	  layout)	  in	  Florida	  caused	  enough	  voter	  confusion	  to	  alter	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  election	  (Everett	  2008,	  883).	  Research	  has	  shown	  that	  bubble	  balloting	  appears	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  usability	  by	  the	  most	  number	  of	  people	  (having	  an	  error	  rate	  of	  1.5%)	  (Everett	  2008,	  884).	  Designing	  effective	  systems	  is	  critical	  to	  conducting	  meaningful	  elections.	  
Researchers	  have	  not	  found	  that	  electronic	  ballots	  have	  a	  significantly	  different	  error	  rates	  from	  paper-­‐based	  voting	  methods,	  however	  so-­‐called	  “post-­‐completion	  errors”,	  which	  stem	  from	  voters	  not	  knowing	  they	  need	  to	  complete	  some	  final	  step	  (i.e.	  a	  submit	  button)	  to	  complete	  their	  voting,	  make	  electronic	  elections	  more	  susceptible	  to	  undervoting	  (Everett	  2008,	  891).	  Web-­‐based	  voting	  systems	  can	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  this	  problem	  by	  reminding	  voters	  that	  their	  ballot	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  submitted	  when	  they	  try	  to	  navigate	  away	  from	  the	  page.	  Inside	  of	  a	  voting	  booth	  however,	  this	  issue	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  mitigate.	  Voters	  who	  fail	  to	  submit	  their	  electronic	  ballots	  are	  termed	  “fleeing	  voters”	  because	  the	  voter	  simply	  walks	  away	  before	  finishing.	  Preventing	  bias	  inherent	  to	  the	  ballots	  is	  important	  in	  designing	  effective	  elections.	  





number	  of	  parties	  or	  affiliations	  (Barker	  et	  al,	  524).	  Researchers	  were	  additionally	  unable	  to	  find	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  education	  levels	  of	  voters	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  alphabetic	  bias	  in	  voting.	  This	  conclusion	  stems	  from	  results	  indicating	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  was	  statistically	  indistinguishable	  between	  student	  and	  faculty	  elections	  (Barker	  et	  al,	  524).	  Alphabetic	  voting	  bias	  in	  the	  studied	  elections	  accounted	  for	  a	  difference	  in	  results	  of	  up	  to	  7.6%	  (Barker	  et	  al,	  525).	  Any	  new	  election	  system	  for	  WPI	  faculty	  should	  recognize	  that	  such	  a	  large	  bias	  could	  affect	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  election	  and	  take	  steps	  to	  prevent	  it.	  Ideally	  a	  system	  for	  faculty	  elections	  would	  capture	  100%	  of	  what	  voters	  intend.	  While	  that	  goal	  may	  not	  be	  practical,	  identifying	  the	  factors	  that	  decrease	  system	  effectiveness	  will	  help	  to	  minimize	  the	  error	  rates.	  





mistrust	  also	  increases	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  paradox	  of	  voting	  on	  the	  result.	  Researchers	  have	  found	  that	  voter	  satisfaction	  is	  not	  always	  tied	  to	  the	  objective	  metrics	  of	  system	  usability.	  Studies	  show	  that	  electronic	  voting	  systems	  generally	  have	  higher	  levels	  of	  voter	  satisfaction	  than	  their	  paper-­‐based	  counterparts	  (Everett	  2008,	  887).	  Neglecting	  voter	  satisfaction	  could	  have	  disastrous	  results	  and	  should	  be	  weighed	  alongside	  other	  considerations	  that	  may	  reduce	  it.	  











3.1.	  Introduction	  to	  Methodology	  The	  team	  began	  the	  project	  completely	  unaware	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  social	  issues	  involved	  in	  small-­‐scale	  Internet	  voting.	  Literature	  review	  helped	  highlight	  the	  general	  issues,	  but	  the	  team	  still	  lacked	  information	  about	  WPI’s	  particular	  requirements,	  technical	  infrastructure,	  and	  political	  climate.	  The	  team	  gathered	  information	  from	  many	  sources:	  
• The	  team	  sent	  the	  faculty	  an	  electronic	  survey	  to	  gather	  statistics	  regarding	  their	  general	  feeling	  about	  Internet	  voting.	  
• Team	  members	  presented	  their	  research	  findings	  and	  solicited	  input	  from	  the	  WPI	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  (COG).	  
• Team	  members	  interviewed	  specific	  faculty	  members	  to	  get	  a	  deeper	  view	  of	  faculty	  opinions	  and	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  them.	  
• The	  team	  interviewed	  several	  knowledgeable	  employees,	  including	  the	  Faculty	  Governance	  Coordinator	  and	  the	  WPI	  Information	  Security	  Officer,	  to	  gather	  expert	  knowledge	  about	  the	  institution.	  





3.2.	  Survey	  Based	  on	  literature	  research,	  the	  team	  identified	  important	  issues	  which	  were	  deemed	  important	  enough	  to	  deserve	  opinions	  from	  WPI’s	  faculty.	  As	  the	  primary	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  proposed	  new	  voting	  system,	  their	  input	  was	  invaluable	  for	  setting	  priorities	  and	  determining	  important	  features	  for	  a	  proposed	  system.	  A	  number	  of	  features	  identified	  by	  the	  team	  were	  listed	  as	  highly	  desirable	  for	  some	  voting	  systems,	  but	  of	  questionable	  utility	  in	  WPI’s	  case.	  By	  obtaining	  faculty	  input,	  the	  team	  was	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  desirability	  of	  these	  features	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  who	  would	  use	  it.	  Additionally,	  the	  survey	  contained	  questions	  formulated	  to	  obtain	  more	  general	  faculty	  attitudes	  on	  electronic	  voting,	  and	  faculty	  voting	  in	  general.	  Through	  the	  survey,	  a	  picture	  of	  faculty	  attitudes	  on	  voting	  could	  be	  obtained.	  This	  could	  be	  used	  to	  gauge	  whether	  the	  project	  was	  supported	  or	  would	  face	  significant	  opposition	  from	  the	  faculty,	  and	  whether	  faculty	  elections	  in	  general	  were	  important	  to	  WPI’s	  voting	  faculty.	  A	  final	  question	  invited	  faculty	  members	  with	  strong	  opinions	  to	  provide	  their	  e-­‐mail	  in	  order	  to	  be	  interviewed	  about	  their	  views	  on	  the	  matter.	  The	  team	  promised	  respondents	  anonymity	  of	  survey	  responses	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  it	  would	  be	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  determine	  how	  anyone	  who	  provided	  their	  email	  address	  answered	  the	  remaining	  questions.	  





elections	  were	  important),	  four	  questions	  on	  respondents’	  opinions	  on	  whether	  an	  electronic	  system	  could	  adequately	  replace	  the	  current	  system,	  six	  specific	  questions	  on	  electronic	  systems	  (desirable	  features	  and	  concerns	  about	  such	  a	  system),	  and	  a	  final	  question	  requesting	  potential	  candidates	  for	  follow-­‐up	  interviews.	  Several	  questions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  survey	  were	  text	  boxes	  paired	  with	  relatively	  open	  questions	  intended	  to	  allow	  faculty	  to	  notify	  the	  group	  if	  something	  important	  or	  concerning	  to	  them	  was	  not	  mentioned	  on	  the	  survey.	  
To	  deploy	  the	  survey,	  the	  team	  obtained	  approval	  from	  the	  WPI	  Institutional	  Review	  Board	  to	  e-­‐mail	  a	  survey	  to	  the	  mailing	  list	  for	  voting	  faculty	  at	  WPI.	  The	  survey	  itself	  was	  constructed	  and	  hosted	  off	  of	  a	  local	  WPI	  server	  (cerebro.cs.wpi.edu)	  so	  that	  responses	  to	  potentially	  sensitive	  questions	  would	  not	  leave	  the	  campus,	  and	  a	  WPI	  login	  was	  required	  to	  vote.	  After	  obtaining	  IRB	  approval,	  the	  team	  had	  an	  administrator	  send	  an	  email	  informing	  faculty	  members	  of	  the	  survey	  on	  the	  team’s	  behalf.	  The	  group	  initially	  targeted	  the	  break	  between	  terms	  for	  deployment	  of	  the	  survey,	  the	  day	  that	  final	  grades	  for	  C	  term	  were	  due,	  to	  ensure	  that	  most	  faculty	  would	  not	  be	  too	  busy	  to	  complete	  the	  survey.	  However,	  requesting	  distribution	  of	  the	  survey	  pushed	  survey	  deployment	  back	  to	  the	  first	  week	  of	  D	  term.	  





literature	  review,	  to	  obtain	  input	  on	  important	  issues	  the	  team	  had	  identified	  (some	  of	  which	  were	  included	  in	  the	  survey,	  while	  others	  were	  discovered	  from	  survey	  responses),	  and	  present	  a	  draft	  of	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  voting	  systems	  to	  the	  committee.	  In	  particular,	  the	  team	  wanted	  to	  obtain	  input	  on	  vote	  updating,	  use	  of	  the	  WPI	  Central	  Authentication	  System	  (CAS)	  to	  authenticate	  voters,	  and	  next	  steps	  in	  gathering	  information.	  Based	  on	  these	  questions,	  and	  the	  Committee’s	  input	  on	  the	  team’s	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  systems	  and	  literary	  review,	  the	  group	  adjusted	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  to	  more	  accurately	  match	  the	  needs	  of	  WPI	  (exact	  changes	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  
3.4.	  Interviews	  





3.4.2.	  Previous	  Attempt	  Interview	  From	  the	  follow-­‐up	  interviews,	  the	  team	  identified	  an	  additional	  person	  of	  interest	  who	  was	  interviewed	  for	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  previous	  development	  of	  a	  similar	  system.	  Professor	  Robert	  Kinicki,	  during	  his	  time	  on	  the	  COG,	  led	  an	  effort	  to	  deploy	  an	  electronic	  system	  for	  voting	  in	  faculty	  elections.	  However,	  the	  faculty	  never	  adopted	  this	  system.	  The	  team	  decided	  to	  prioritize	  conducting	  an	  interview	  with	  him,	  as	  knowledge	  of	  why	  his	  previous	  system	  failed	  could	  be	  invaluable.	  Ideally	  the	  team	  could	  address	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  previous	  system	  to	  prevent	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  proposed	  new	  system,	  or	  identify	  shortcomings	  that	  could	  not	  be	  addressed,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  the	  team	  recommending	  that	  the	  existing	  system	  be	  retained.	  
3.4.3.	  IT	  Professional	  Interview	  Based	  on	  concerns	  expressed	  by	  Professor	  Kinicki	  in	  his	  interview,	  the	  team	  decided	  to	  interview	  a	  member	  of	  the	  WPI	  IT	  staff	  to	  determine	  what	  requirements,	  if	  any,	  they	  had	  for	  a	  voting	  system	  to	  be	  deployed	  at	  WPI.	  Phil	  Denault,	  WPI’s	  information	  security	  officer,	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  person	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  relevant	  information	  and	  feedback,	  and	  an	  interview	  was	  scheduled.	  Questions	  were	  developed,	  both	  from	  the	  team’s	  research	  and	  Professor	  Kinicki’s	  interview.	  After	  the	  first	  interview,	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  was	  also	  conducted	  to	  review	  the	  team’s	  proposed	  evaluation	  criteria	  and	  identify	  any	  deficiencies.	  





on	  Governance	  and	  other	  interviews.	  This	  interview	  allowed	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  behind	  the	  scenes	  process	  of	  vote	  counting	  and	  distribution	  in	  the	  current	  system	  at	  WPI.	  Furthermore,	  by	  discussing	  the	  current	  system’s	  advantages	  and	  flaws	  with	  one	  very	  knowledgable,	  the	  team	  could	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  justifications	  for	  a	  new	  voting	  system	  and	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  improvement	  was	  desirable.	  
3.5.	  Evaluation	  Criteria	  Through	  interviews	  and	  literature	  review,	  the	  team	  obtained	  an	  understanding	  of	  desirable	  characteristics	  for	  a	  voting	  system,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  creating	  a	  set	  of	  accurate,	  detailed,	  and	  complete	  requirements	  that	  faculty	  governance	  must	  take	  into	  consideration	  when	  making	  a	  decision	  on	  what	  actions	  to	  take.	  The	  criteria	  provide	  a	  method	  for	  grading	  a	  voting	  system’s	  suitability	  for	  use	  at	  WPI.	  They	  are	  almost	  as	  important,	  or	  perhaps	  just	  as	  important,	  as	  the	  final	  system	  proposal,	  as	  they	  represent	  a	  concrete	  set	  of	  requirements	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  or	  build	  voting	  systems	  suitable	  for	  use	  at	  WPI.	  The	  team’s	  goal	  was	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  faculty	  voting	  system,	  both	  in	  general	  and	  specific	  to	  WPI,	  and	  to	  apply	  this	  knowledge	  to	  concretely	  state	  these	  requirements	  and	  rank	  them	  by	  importance.	  





to	  supplement	  the	  previous	  criteria.	  Interviews	  provided	  supplementary	  data	  to	  refine	  the	  previously	  created	  criteria	  and	  create	  more,	  where	  needed.	  The	  interview	  with	  Professor	  Kinicki,	  for	  example,	  provided	  several	  new	  evaluation	  criteria.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  criteria,	  and	  the	  team’s	  method	  of	  measuring	  it,	  also	  evolved	  as	  time	  went	  on.	  All	  criteria	  were	  graded	  as	  required	  (considered	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  system	  success),	  strongly	  recommended	  (valuable	  features	  which	  could	  recommend	  a	  system	  over	  another	  which	  lacked	  them),	  and	  advantageous	  (nice	  to	  have	  features,	  but	  not	  more	  desirable	  than	  others).	  A	  scorecard,	  contained	  in	  Appendix	  F,	  was	  built	  from	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  at-­‐a-­‐glance	  evaluation	  of	  the	  suitability	  of	  a	  system.	  This	  scorecard	  was	  structured	  to	  permit	  easy	  evaluation	  of	  systems	  for	  suitability.	  





4.	  Data	  and	  Analysis	  
4.1.	  Introduction	  to	  Data	  and	  Analysis	  Finding	  and	  evaluating	  systems	  based	  on	  their	  suitability	  for	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  WPI	  faculty	  elections	  requires	  more	  than	  a	  review	  of	  literature;	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  team	  to	  conduct	  surveys,	  interviews,	  and	  usability	  studies	  to	  identify	  relevant	  problems,	  including	  institutional	  and	  human	  problems	  that	  a	  potential	  system	  might	  face.	  Using	  all	  of	  this	  information,	  in	  combination	  with	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  review	  of	  literature,	  the	  team	  developed	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  to	  use	  in	  evaluating	  the	  viability	  of	  potential	  systems	  for	  WPI	  Faculty	  elections.	  Using	  these	  criteria	  the	  team	  evaluated	  a	  number	  of	  existing	  systems,	  including	  the	  system	  that	  is	  currently	  in	  use,	  to	  determine	  how	  well	  suited	  they	  are	  for	  faculty	  elections.	  These	  evaluation	  criteria	  were	  integral	  to	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  recommendation,	  and	  should	  stand	  as	  a	  way	  of	  finding	  alternatives,	  should	  implementation	  of	  the	  team’s	  final	  recommendation	  uncover	  unforeseen	  challenges.	  





not	  something	  the	  team	  had	  considered.	  Learning	  from	  this,	  the	  team	  was	  sure	  to	  clarify	  in	  later	  writings	  that	  recommendations	  would	  not	  include	  such	  proceedings.	  
Following	  the	  aggregation	  of	  data	  from	  the	  survey	  responses,	  the	  team	  noted	  the	  following	  results:	  
• 92%	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  faculty	  elections	  matter	  to	  them.	  
• 84%	  of	  respondents	  voted	  in	  most	  elections.	  
• 26%	  of	  respondents	  believe	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  keep	  their	  vote	  private.	  
• 14%	  of	  respondents	  believe	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  would	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  tampering.	  
• 82%	  of	  respondents	  felt	  that	  electronic	  voting	  would	  make	  it	  more	  convenient	  to	  vote,	  allow	  off-­‐campus	  private	  voting,	  and	  greatly	  reduce	  the	  time	  to	  count	  votes;	  and	  found	  these	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  switch.	  
• 84%	  of	  respondents	  support	  a	  switch	  to	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system.	  
• The	  major	  concerns	  faculty	  members	  presented	  throughout	  the	  survey	  were	  concern	  about	  disclosure	  of	  the	  public	  record	  of	  who	  voted,	  and	  the	  potential	  ability	  of	  a	  voter	  to	  vote	  more	  than	  once.	  
• Some	  respondents,	  misunderstanding	  the	  team’s	  intentions,	  indicated	  concerns	  about	  using	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  when	  motions	  are	  raised	  during	  faculty	  meetings.	  





4.2.1.	  Analysis	  of	  Survey	  Results	  In	  all,	  the	  survey	  respondents	  feel	  that	  switching	  faculty	  committee	  elections	  to	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  is	  a	  good	  idea.	  Because	  the	  survey	  itself	  is	  electronic,	  the	  true	  percentage	  of	  voting	  faculty	  in	  support	  is	  most	  likely	  lower	  than	  84%,	  but	  the	  team	  still	  suspect	  that	  responses	  would	  not	  have	  been	  so	  positive	  if	  there	  were	  not	  a	  clear	  majority.	  There	  is	  the	  thought	  among	  a	  few	  survey	  respondents	  that	  electronic	  voting	  will	  increase	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  tampering	  (12%)	  and	  decrease	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  keep	  their	  vote	  private	  (26%).	  	  The	  team	  made	  note	  of	  this	  and	  will	  adequately	  address	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  final	  proposal.	  This	  aside,	  respondents	  indicated	  the	  belief	  that	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  literature,	  and	  their	  own	  feedback,	  are	  equally	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  either	  paper-­‐based	  or	  electronically-­‐based	  voting	  systems.	  If	  an	  electronic	  system	  is	  adopted	  however,	  respondents	  requested	  voting	  reminders	  still	  be	  sent	  out	  on	  paper	  to	  mitigate	  lost	  votes	  due	  to	  the	  oversight	  of	  an	  email.	  Faculty	  also	  indicated	  some	  interest	  in	  additional	  features	  an	  electronic	  system	  can	  offer,	  such	  as	  a	  publicly	  visible	  validation	  of	  a	  vote.	  	  





results,	  the	  team	  strongly	  believes	  casting	  a	  ballot	  under	  the	  new	  system	  should	  take	  no	  more	  time	  than	  under	  the	  current	  system.	  





that	  the	  team	  was	  looking	  for	  responses	  and	  faculty	  could	  send	  a	  response	  directly	  to	  the	  advisor	  instead	  of	  utilizing	  the	  web-­‐based	  survey	  form.	  
4.3.	  Meeting	  with	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  The	  team	  presented	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Governance	  (COG)	  along	  with	  summaries	  of	  research	  and	  data	  that	  had	  been	  completed.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  to	  gauge	  the	  level	  of	  support	  that	  faculty	  governance	  had	  for	  the	  project	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  were	  not	  missing	  anything	  that	  COG	  members	  thought	  was	  critical.	  The	  team	  found	  COG	  to	  be	  very	  supportive	  of	  the	  project	  and	  interested	  in	  seeing	  a	  new	  voting	  system	  in	  place	  soon.	  Members	  of	  the	  COG	  seemed	  equally	  accepting	  of	  both	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  solutions	  and	  student	  created	  (MQP)	  solutions.	  COG	  members	  seemed	  willing	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  WPI	  system	  might	  require	  a	  custom	  solution	  and	  agreed	  that	  students	  could	  tackle	  this	  problem.	  





is	  not	  necessary	  in	  the	  current	  system	  and	  has	  not	  been	  specifically	  requested	  by	  faculty.	  After	  a	  brief	  discussion	  on	  usability	  the	  COG	  recommended	  including	  support	  for	  a	  mobile	  app	  to	  increase	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  an	  electronic	  system.	  Overall,	  the	  COG	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  and	  seemed	  eager	  to	  see	  the	  results	  of	  evaluations	  along	  with	  a	  final	  proposal.	  
The	  COG	  provided	  helpful	  insight	  into	  where	  priorities	  should	  be	  in	  the	  evaluation	  criteria.	  Meeting	  with	  the	  COG	  helped	  to	  cement	  the	  idea	  that	  strong	  security	  mechanisms	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  system	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  interfere	  with	  other	  priorities,	  but	  will	  probably	  never	  be	  necessary.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  on	  privacy	  and	  coercion	  resistance.	  The	  COG	  emphasized	  that	  system	  usability	  should	  be	  considered	  first	  and	  foremost,	  which	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  required	  usability	  criteria.	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  COG’s	  doubt	  around	  vote-­‐updating	  the	  team	  decided	  that	  although	  vote	  updating	  might	  be	  beneficial	  according	  to	  the	  literature,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  priority	  for	  WPI	  faculty.	  The	  COG	  agreed	  with	  the	  team	  that	  using	  CAS	  would	  make	  the	  system	  much	  easier	  to	  use	  and	  would	  be	  very	  beneficial	  provided	  it	  does	  not	  compromise	  privacy.	  Presenting	  the	  team’s	  initial	  findings	  to	  the	  leaders	  and	  organizers	  of	  faculty	  governance	  was	  critical	  to	  developing	  the	  relevant	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  voting	  systems.	  
4.4.	  Interviews	  





interviewed.	  One	  was	  a	  relatively	  new	  faculty	  member	  who	  specializes	  in	  computer	  security,	  another	  was	  a	  longtime	  faculty	  member	  who	  had	  served	  on	  COG,	  and	  a	  third	  was	  a	  young	  proponent	  of	  e-­‐voting	  in	  the	  social	  science	  department.	  No	  faculty	  member	  interviewed	  believes	  the	  current	  voting	  system	  is	  inconvenient;	  they	  all	  think	  the	  process	  of	  getting	  a	  ballot,	  ranking	  the	  candidates	  on	  it,	  and	  returning	  it	  in	  the	  provided	  ballot	  envelope	  is	  a	  very	  effective	  and	  usable	  process;	  in	  fact,	  one	  faculty	  member	  suggested	  that	  the	  current	  system	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  baseline	  standard	  for	  usability.	  





4.4.2.	  Interview	  with	  WPI	  Information	  Security	  Officer	  The	  WPI	  Information	  Security	  officer	  believes	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  system	  is	  very	  low,	  as	  it	  contains	  very	  little	  information	  that,	  if	  leaked,	  could	  cause	  financial	  damage	  to	  WPI.	  The	  worst	  consequence	  of	  a	  total	  release	  of	  all	  ballots	  would	  be	  some	  embarrassment	  and	  angry	  faculty	  members,	  but	  the	  lack	  of	  credit	  card	  numbers,	  personal	  addresses,	  and	  other	  sensitive	  data	  makes	  security	  a	  low	  priority	  from	  his	  perspective.	  He	  unequivocally	  believed	  that	  local,	  onsite	  hosting	  would	  be	  much	  less	  expensive	  than	  off-­‐campus	  hosting,	  but	  pointed	  out	  that	  any	  system	  should	  be	  easy	  for	  administrators	  to	  deploy	  and	  maintain.	  In	  particular,	  he	  said	  there	  should	  be	  complete,	  reliable	  documentation	  on	  how	  to	  set	  up	  and	  administer	  the	  tool.	  He	  also	  said	  it	  would	  be	  a	  plus	  if	  there	  was	  a	  third	  party	  company	  that	  could	  be	  paid	  to	  support	  the	  tool,	  as	  the	  faculty	  voting	  system	  is	  not	  used	  commonly	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  worth	  having	  an	  administrator	  learn	  to	  configure	  yet	  another	  tool.	  Failing	  third-­‐party	  support,	  third-­‐party	  training	  would	  help	  get	  the	  IT	  department	  up	  and	  running	  with	  an	  electronic	  system	  faster	  than	  just	  providing	  documentation.	  Lastly,	  the	  Information	  Security	  Officer	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  important	  for	  maintainability	  to	  separate	  the	  backing	  database	  from	  the	  frontend.	  





interviews,	  the	  team	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  gather	  detailed	  input	  from	  any	  members	  of	  this	  group,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  resistance	  will	  be	  as	  strong	  now	  that	  several	  years	  have	  passed.	  Another	  strong	  concern	  of	  Professor	  Kinicki’s	  was	  maintainability	  -­‐	  the	  prototype	  system	  he	  proposed	  was	  developed	  by	  himself	  and	  one	  other	  person,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  IT	  department	  whom	  many	  believed	  would	  retire	  soon;	  faculty	  members	  raised	  questions	  about	  who	  would	  maintain	  the	  system	  with	  the	  author	  leaving	  the	  university.	  On	  top	  of	  those	  concerns,	  Professor	  Kinicki	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  authenticating	  users	  while	  keeping	  their	  vote	  private.	  Professor	  Kinicki	  also	  addressed	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  questions	  overshadowing	  the	  entire	  project:	  will	  the	  response	  rate	  increase	  or	  decrease	  as	  a	  result	  of	  moving	  to	  an	  electronic	  system?	  The	  response	  rate	  might	  increase	  due	  to	  lower	  voting	  barriers	  to	  off-­‐campus	  faculty	  members,	  but	  it	  might	  decrease	  due	  to	  distrust	  of	  the	  new	  system	  or	  confusion	  as	  to	  its	  use.	  Professor	  Kinicki	  stressed	  that	  usability	  must	  be	  the	  paramount	  concern	  for	  any	  proposed	  system.	  










5.	  Evaluation	  Criteria	  
5.1.	  Final	  Evaluation	  Criteria	  The	  final	  set	  of	  evaluation	  criteria	  generally	  follows	  logically	  from	  the	  team’s	  research	  and	  interviews.	  These	  completed	  criteria	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  requirements	  the	  team	  believe	  will	  produce	  a	  voting	  system	  suitable	  for	  WPI.	  The	  criteria	  themselves	  are	  listed	  below	  followed	  by	  explanations	  of	  several	  criteria	  the	  team	  felt	  were	  interesting	  or	  controversial.	  As	  previously	  noted,	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  are	  all	  graded	  based	  on	  the	  team’s	  determination	  of	  how	  important	  they	  are	  to	  a	  voting	  system	  for	  WPI,	  with	  required	  being	  the	  criteria	  most	  important	  to	  a	  system’s	  success	  and	  advantageous	  being	  the	  least	  important.	  
5.1.1.	  Security	  Criteria	  
• Required:	  The	  system	  verifies	  the	  voter's	  identity	  and	  eligibility	  before	  a	  ballot	  is	  distributed	  or	  submitted.	  
• Required:	  No	  person	  is	  easily	  able	  to	  gain	  identifiable	  information	  from	  the	  system	  about	  another	  person’s	  vote.	  This	  includes	  WPI	  System	  Administrators	  and	  Election	  Officials;	  while	  a	  user	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  see	  other	  votes,	  they	  cannot	  determine	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  casting	  them	  
• Required:	  The	  system	  takes	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  prevent	  any	  voter	  from	  casting	  a	  second	  vote.	  





• Strongly	  Recommended:	  The	  system	  leverages	  other	  entities	  that	  the	  faculty	  already	  trusts	  to	  be	  secure	  (e.g.	  the	  WPI	  Central	  Authentication	  System).	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  voter	  any	  information	  which	  he	  or	  she	  could	  use	  to	  prove	  his	  or	  her	  vote	  to	  an	  attacker	  (i.e.	  the	  voter	  receives	  no	  receipt).	  
5.1.2.	  Trust	  Criteria	  
• Strongly	  Recommended:	  Complete	  source	  code	  and	  technical	  specifications	  for	  the	  system	  are	  freely	  available.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  provide	  any	  voter	  or	  researcher	  who	  asks	  all	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  construct	  an	  exact	  replica	  of	  the	  system.	  
• Strongly	  Recommended:	  A	  brief	  summary	  of	  how	  the	  system	  works,	  understandable	  by	  nontechnical	  readers,	  is	  easily	  available	  for	  review	  by	  the	  public.	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  provides	  a	  way	  for	  voters	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (individual	  verifiability).	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  enables	  voters	  to	  independently	  verify	  that	  all	  votes	  were	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (universal	  verifiability).	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  enables	  one	  to	  change	  one's	  vote	  after	  it	  is	  first	  cast	  (vote-­‐updating).	  
5.1.3.	  Usability	  Criteria	  
• Required:	  The	  user	  is	  able	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  without	  extensive	  training.	  
• Strongly	  Recommended:	  For	  a	  voter	  experienced	  with	  both	  the	  current	  and	  proposed	  system,	  casting	  a	  ballot	  does	  not	  take	  more	  time	  than	  the	  current	  system.	  





• Strongly	  Recommended:	  The	  system	  contains	  effective	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  voter	  from	  accidentally	  recording	  under-­‐votes	  (absence	  of	  a	  candidate	  vote)	  and	  over-­‐votes	  (voting	  for	  multiple	  candidates	  in	  the	  same	  election).	  
• Strongly	  Recommended:	  The	  voting	  interface	  clearly	  depicts	  to	  the	  user	  which	  candidates	  their	  vote	  will	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  mis-­‐voting.	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  does	  not	  require	  the	  voter	  to	  remember	  information	  (e.g.	  codes)	  or	  carry	  a	  physical	  item	  in	  addition	  to	  what	  he	  or	  she	  already	  carries/remembers	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  a	  WPI	  faculty	  member.	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	  
• Advantageous:	  The	  system	  provides	  an	  interface	  that	  is	  usable	  for	  voting	  on	  smartphones	  and/or	  tablets.	  
5.1.4.	  Institutional	  Requirements	  Criteria	  
• Required:	  The	  system	  must	  count	  votes	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  method	  described	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  handbook.	  This	  includes	  support	  for	  recounts.	  
• Required:	  The	  team	  finds	  the	  cost	  of	  implementing	  and	  maintaining	  the	  system	  and	  running	  an	  election	  acceptable.	  
• Strongly	  Recommended:	  Complete	  technical	  documentation	  for	  deployment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  





• Advantageous:	  Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  available	  by	  the	  producing	  company	  or	  a	  third	  party.	  
5.2.	  Reasoning	  behind	  the	  Criteria	  The	  team	  decided	  upon	  a	  relatively	  lax	  coercion	  resistance	  criterion,	  only	  recommending	  that	  no	  receipt	  of	  which	  candidates	  were	  voted	  for	  be	  distributed	  (receipt	  freeness).	  While	  the	  team	  feels	  that	  coercion	  or	  vote	  buying	  are	  a	  concern	  in	  a	  voting	  system	  at	  WPI	  (while	  unlikely,	  they	  can	  completely	  swing	  the	  results	  of	  an	  election),	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  coercion	  resistance	  with	  an	  uncontrolled	  voting	  environment.	  For	  example,	  any	  coercion	  resistance	  included	  is	  pointless	  if	  the	  coercer	  is	  watching	  the	  voter	  as	  they	  cast	  their	  vote,	  which	  cannot	  be	  prevented.	  Receipt	  freeness	  is	  a	  reasonable	  standard	  of	  coercion	  resistance	  that	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  ensure	  and,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  hinders	  coercion	  or	  vote	  buying.	  The	  survey	  and	  interviews	  reflect	  that	  coercion	  and	  vote-­‐buying	  is	  not	  particularly	  concerning	  to	  anyone	  who	  chose	  to	  share	  their	  thoughts	  with	  the	  team,	  helping	  to	  justify	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  include	  stronger	  coercion	  resistance	  requirements.	  





Finally,	  it	  can	  increase	  trust	  in	  a	  new	  voting	  system,	  as	  less-­‐than-­‐confident	  first	  time	  users	  know	  that,	  even	  if	  they	  complete	  their	  ballot	  incorrectly,	  they	  can	  always	  try	  again.	  Many	  of	  the	  the	  interviewees	  expressed	  skepticism	  about	  the	  need	  for	  vote	  updating	  and	  voiced	  potential	  disadvantages,	  including	  hackers	  altering	  a	  voter’s	  ballot	  after	  gaining	  access	  to	  their	  system.	  Despite	  this	  reaction	  team	  believes	  that	  the	  advantages	  of	  vote	  updating	  make	  any	  system	  including	  it	  stronger,	  though	  it	  is	  not	  a	  requirement	  for	  any	  new	  voting	  system.	  
The	  team	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  current	  system	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  usability	  (in	  terms	  of	  time	  taken	  to	  vote,	  and	  ease	  of	  vote	  completion)	  for	  any	  proposed	  new	  voting	  system.	  This	  evaluation	  criteria	  was	  initially	  controversial	  amongst	  team	  members,	  and	  attempts	  were	  made	  to	  locate	  a	  reasonable	  measure	  of	  voting	  system	  usability,	  with	  regards	  to	  time	  -­‐	  a	  specific	  amount	  of	  time	  it	  should	  take	  a	  voter	  to	  complete	  a	  ballot,	  for	  example.	  No	  such	  efficient	  metric	  could	  be	  found	  through	  the	  team’s	  review	  of	  relevant	  papers.	  However,	  follow	  up	  interviews	  to	  the	  survey	  unanimously	  noted	  that	  the	  current	  system	  was	  perfectly	  fine	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  voters,	  taking	  minimal	  time	  and	  effort	  to	  complete	  a	  ballot.	  Consequently,	  stating	  that	  the	  proposed	  system	  takes	  as	  much	  time	  to	  complete	  a	  ballot	  as	  the	  old	  system	  ensures	  that	  voters	  will	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot,	  at	  minimum.	  This	  will	  help	  prevent	  a	  drop	  in	  response	  rate	  from	  tedious	  to	  complete	  ballots	  that	  might	  deter	  voters.	  





taken	  external	  to	  the	  system,	  or	  modifications	  that	  could	  be	  made,	  which	  would	  improve	  a	  system’s	  suitability.	  
5.3.	  Evaluation	  of	  Systems	  
5.3.1.	  Current	  System	  To	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  recommending	  a	  replacement	  for	  the	  current	  voting	  system,	  the	  team	  evaluated	  the	  current	  voting	  system	  using	  the	  evaluation	  scorecard	  developed	  for	  rating	  replacement	  systems.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  evaluation	  are	  contained	  in	  Appendix	  C-­‐1	  and	  were	  generally	  unsurprising.	  The	  current	  voting	  system	  is,	  overall,	  quite	  suitable	  for	  use	  at	  WPI.	  Its	  main	  deficiency	  rests	  in	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  tally	  an	  election	  under	  the	  current	  system.	  The	  system	  otherwise	  offers	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  convenience	  to	  the	  common	  voter,	  supported	  by	  the	  team’s	  interviews	  -­‐	  no	  interviewee	  expressed	  concern	  about	  usability	  from	  the	  voter’s	  perspective.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  current	  system	  does	  not	  offers	  checks	  on	  ballot	  validity,	  which	  allows	  voters	  to	  submit	  invalid	  ballots;	  this	  causes	  a	  small	  number	  of	  ballots	  to	  be	  thrown	  out	  in	  every	  election.	  Despite	  this,	  there	  are	  many	  upsides	  to	  the	  current	  system,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  guarantees	  that	  attempts	  to	  solve	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  successful.	  The	  current	  system	  thus	  represents	  a	  solid	  baseline	  to	  compare	  other	  systems	  to	  in	  terms	  of	  voter	  experience.	  





made	  for	  ranked	  voting	  in	  Helios	  as	  presently	  released,	  nor	  the	  instant	  runoff	  counting	  method	  used	  by	  WPI.	  Changing	  the	  algorithm	  used	  to	  determine	  winners	  would	  not	  be	  particularly	  challenging,	  but	  adding	  the	  capability	  to	  perform	  ranked	  voting	  could	  be	  much	  more	  complex.	  Helios	  is	  a	  cryptographically	  secure	  system,	  and	  adding	  a	  new	  type	  of	  vote	  (ranked)	  could	  potentially	  require	  modification	  of	  the	  integrated	  cryptographic	  code.	  In	  addition,	  Helios	  as	  a	  system	  focuses	  on	  integrity	  of	  the	  ballot	  and	  counting,	  emphasizing	  it	  over	  the	  privacy	  of	  voters.	  Helios	  permits	  votes	  to	  be	  tied	  to	  those	  who	  cast	  them	  by	  an	  administrator;	  something	  several	  interviewees	  noted	  might	  be	  a	  concern	  for	  WPI	  faculty.	  Given	  these	  considerations,	  the	  team	  considers	  Helios	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  further	  consideration,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  a	  drop-­‐in	  solution	  to	  meet	  WPI’s	  needs.	  





indicated	  by	  the	  survey	  and	  interviews),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  recommend	  Scantegrity	  over	  a	  locally	  developed	  scanned	  ballot	  system,	  should	  a	  paper	  system	  be	  desirable.	  
5.3.4.	  EBallot	  EBallot,	  a	  commercial	  cloud-­‐hosted	  Internet	  voting	  system	  (Evaluation	  available	  in	  Appendix	  C-­‐4,	  and	  online	  at	  https://eballot.votenet.com/),	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  successful	  (commercial)	  dedicated	  e-­‐voting	  systems	  available.	  Details	  available	  are	  limited,	  as	  no	  public,	  usable	  demo	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  The	  system	  does	  support	  ranked	  voting,	  though	  they	  do	  not	  specify	  the	  counting	  algorithm	  used.	  However,	  as	  WPI’s	  counting	  system	  is	  a	  locally	  developed	  variant	  of	  Instant	  Runoff,	  it	  can	  be	  safely	  said	  that	  EBallot	  does	  not	  use	  the	  WPI	  system.	  Thus,	  for	  EBallot	  to	  be	  considered,	  the	  company	  who	  manages	  it	  must	  be	  contacted	  to	  verify	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  adapt	  their	  program	  to	  use	  WPI’s	  counting	  algorithm.	  Additionally,	  the	  system,	  being	  externally	  hosted,	  would	  host	  a	  record	  of	  the	  votes	  of	  faculty	  members	  on	  EBallot’s	  servers.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  risk	  to	  privacy,	  and	  one	  that	  interviews	  indicated	  there	  might	  be	  concern	  about.	  The	  team	  finds	  it	  difficult	  to	  recommend	  the	  use	  of	  EBallot	  given	  this.	  





SurveyMonkey	  itself	  cannot	  tally	  results	  to	  determine	  winners,	  though	  it	  can	  export	  all	  ballots	  as	  an	  Excel	  spreadsheet.	  A	  program	  could	  then	  be	  written	  to	  determine	  winners	  from	  this	  spreadsheet.	  However,	  the	  effort	  of	  locally	  developing	  this	  program	  is	  likely	  almost	  as	  much	  work	  as	  adapting	  an	  existing,	  dedicated	  voting	  system,	  which	  would	  offer	  a	  superior,	  more	  integrated	  experience	  for	  both	  voters	  and	  election	  officials.	  Furthermore,	  SurveyMonkey	  is	  weak	  on	  privacy	  front.	  SurveyMonkey	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  implement	  authentication	  and	  privacy	  at	  the	  same	  time;	  it	  can	  have	  either	  authentication,	  or	  privacy,	  but	  not	  both	  simultaneously.	  If	  a	  voter	  authenticates	  to	  a	  SurveyMonkey	  survey,	  their	  name	  is	  stored	  with	  their	  vote,	  enabling	  election	  officials	  to	  tie	  every	  voter	  to	  their	  ballot.	  This,	  combined	  with	  SurveyMonkey	  being	  a	  cloud-­‐hosted	  system	  (with	  concerns	  similar	  to	  EBallot),	  would	  likely	  be	  very	  concerning	  to	  WPI	  faculty,	  given	  information	  from	  interviews.	  Thus,	  the	  team	  does	  not	  recommend	  that	  SurveyMonkey	  be	  pursued	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  current	  voting	  system.	  





into	  a	  separate	  question	  and	  prompt	  for	  the	  voter’s	  rating	  of	  the	  candidate,	  and	  no	  error-­‐checking	  to	  ensure	  that	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  same	  ranking	  could	  be	  effectively	  performed	  by	  MyWPI.	  This	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  submit	  an	  invalid	  ballot	  unintentionally.	  While	  either	  of	  these	  systems	  could	  potentially	  be	  adapted	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  WPI’s	  voting	  faculty,	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  involved	  would	  likely	  be	  comparable	  to	  adapting	  or	  developing	  a	  dedicated	  voting	  solution	  which	  would	  offer	  a	  more	  usable	  and	  secure	  voting	  system	  (being	  purpose-­‐built	  with	  these	  qualities	  in	  mind).	  





A	  further	  alternative	  would	  be	  to	  create	  a	  custom	  voting	  system	  for	  WPI.	  This	  would,	  in	  the	  team’s	  opinion,	  be	  a	  project	  of	  roughly	  (large)	  MQP	  scale,	  though	  it	  could	  also	  be	  created	  by	  IT	  staff.	  Given	  WPI’s	  unique	  variant	  of	  Instant	  Runoff	  for	  vote	  counting	  and	  need	  for	  nominating	  ballots	  with	  somewhat	  complex	  rules,	  a	  brand-­‐new	  system	  would	  likely	  be	  better-­‐suited	  to	  WPI’s	  needs	  than	  either	  EBallot	  or	  Helios	  could	  be,	  even	  with	  extensive	  adaption.	  The	  team	  believes	  that	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  that	  were	  created	  to	  evaluate	  existing	  systems	  would	  serve	  as	  an	  excellent	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  such	  a	  system,	  were	  it	  to	  be	  created.	  The	  team	  has	  confidence	  that	  a	  new	  system	  satisfying	  the	  required	  evaluation	  criteria	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  recommended	  and	  advantageous	  criteria	  would	  be	  an	  excellent	  fit	  for	  WPI	  and	  would	  satisfy	  the	  concern	  of	  many	  in	  the	  faculty.	  WPI	  CS	  faculty	  and	  the	  IT	  staff’s	  Information	  Security	  team	  could	  audit	  such	  a	  system	  after	  its	  creation	  to	  ensure	  it	  was	  secure,	  free	  of	  preprogrammed	  backdoors,	  and	  reliable	  enough	  for	  regular	  use	  at	  WPI.	  The	  team	  believes	  that	  this	  solution,	  creating	  a	  new,	  customized	  voting	  system,	  is	  the	  best	  fit	  for	  WPI,	  given	  the	  state	  of	  alternative	  systems.	  





authenticity	  in	  any	  voting	  system,	  and	  while	  the	  team	  believes	  that	  privacy	  is	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  others	  are	  unimportant.	  	  
The	  team	  feels	  that	  the	  individual	  verification	  feature	  of	  Helios	  and	  other	  voting	  systems	  is	  a	  desirable	  feature	  for	  a	  new	  voting	  system	  to	  include.	  Having	  evaluated	  Helios	  and	  investigated	  the	  use	  of	  this	  feature,	  the	  team	  believes	  that	  this	  feature	  will	  add	  little	  complexity	  from	  a	  voter’s	  perspective	  and	  offer	  the	  assurance	  of	  integrity	  -­‐	  every	  voter	  can	  verify	  that	  his	  or	  her	  ballot	  was	  counted.	  As	  there	  is	  some	  concern	  among	  faculty	  that	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  could	  be	  easily	  manipulated	  to	  change	  the	  winners	  of	  elections,	  adding	  an	  assurance	  that	  ballots	  were	  counted	  could	  increase	  trust	  in	  the	  new	  system.	  Universal	  verification,	  the	  counterpart	  of	  individual	  verification	  that	  enables	  entire	  elections	  to	  be	  securely	  audited,	  could	  also	  be	  included,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  technically	  difficult	  feature	  (involving	  large	  amounts	  of	  complex	  cryptography)	  and	  potentially	  has	  negative	  privacy	  implications	  (revealing	  vote	  counts	  publically	  as	  a	  possible	  example).	  Consequently,	  the	  team	  does	  not	  recommend	  the	  inclusion	  of	  universal	  verification	  in	  a	  system	  written	  for	  WPI.	  










6.	  Usability	  Study	  Existing	  literature,	  which	  often	  discusses	  the	  failure	  of	  electronic	  voting	  systems,	  raises	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  usability	  of	  the	  ballot.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  minimizing	  these	  issues,	  the	  team	  started	  the	  process	  of	  designing	  an	  interface	  for	  the	  voting	  system.	  The	  team	  is	  concerned	  with	  making	  a	  user-­‐interface	  that	  will	  protect	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  user,	  streamline	  the	  voting	  process	  so	  that	  it	  has	  minimal	  cognitive	  effort,	  mitigate	  voter	  errors,	  and	  provide	  the	  interface	  without	  extra	  work	  to	  the	  voter.	  For	  the	  benefit	  of	  system	  developers,	  the	  team	  created	  testable	  mockups	  of	  several	  voting	  interfaces.	  The	  team	  showed	  these	  mock-­‐ups	  to	  experts	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human-­‐computer	  interaction	  (HCI),	  who	  gave	  feedback	  that	  the	  team	  used	  to	  develop	  second	  drafts.	  The	  team	  then	  performed	  a	  study	  on	  the	  usability	  of	  the	  mockups	  to	  determine	  any	  defects.	  	  





deviate	  from	  the	  voting	  interface,	  yet	  wanted	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  which	  cannot	  lead	  to	  overvoting	  or	  accidental	  undervoting.	  The	  result	  was	  an	  interface	  which	  allows	  a	  voter	  to	  rank	  their	  candidate	  choices	  via	  drag-­‐and-­‐drop	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  1).	  
	  





interface	  which	  operates	  nearly	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  current	  system,	  except	  numbers	  are	  typed	  (instead	  of	  written)	  next	  to	  candidates’	  names	  (Shown	  in	  Figure	  2).
	  
Figure	  2:	  Initial	  Alternative	  Voting	  Interface	  





computer	  interactions,	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  review	  the	  team’s	  mockup	  interfaces.	  Both	  provided	  feedback	  on	  ways	  to	  increase	  the	  usability	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  interface	  designs.	  Given	  that	  usability	  is	  often	  counterintuitive,	  obtaining	  input	  from	  trained	  professionals	  was	  invaluable.	  Hence	  meeting	  with	  two	  HCI	  professors	  gave	  the	  team	  different	  approaches	  to	  improving	  the	  interface,	  and	  parts	  of	  both	  were	  included	  in	  the	  final	  design.	  Their	  detailed	  recommendations	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.4.	  





or	  the	  alternative	  numerical	  fill-­‐in	  (analogous	  to	  the	  current	  ballot).	  The	  team	  observed	  how	  the	  user	  navigated	  through	  the	  interface	  without	  assistance,	  and	  made	  note	  of	  any	  mistakes,	  confusion,	  or	  stumbles	  by	  the	  user.	  	  After	  all	  the	  participants	  completed	  their	  ballots,	  the	  team	  pooled	  the	  data	  and	  used	  the	  most	  common	  errors	  to	  streamline	  the	  proposed	  voting	  interface.	  





share	  a	  common	  process	  to	  complete	  the	  ballot.
	  























































they	  believed	  the	  electronic	  interfaces	  shown	  in	  the	  study	  would	  be	  more	  usable	  than	  the	  present	  paper	  ballots.	  
The	  team	  interprets	  these	  results	  as	  a	  successful	  demonstration	  of	  the	  usability	  of	  the	  proposed	  interface;	  but	  will	  maintain	  the	  example	  video	  for	  those	  who	  want	  to	  learn	  the	  system	  before	  using	  it.	  Participants	  who	  watched	  the	  video	  were	  quicker	  to	  perform	  the	  actual	  vote,	  but	  due	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  video	  the	  overall	  time	  taken	  was	  greater	  than	  those	  who	  did	  not.	  Users	  who	  are	  less	  comfortable	  when	  presented	  with	  a	  new	  interface	  might	  still	  find	  the	  video	  useful.	  One	  user	  reported	  “I	  wasn’t	  sure	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  paper”	  and	  first	  tried	  to	  click	  on	  the	  drag-­‐drop	  option.	  Following	  their	  experience,	  this	  user	  stated	  that	  it	  might	  have	  been	  better	  to	  watch	  the	  video.	  Another	  user	  reported	  that	  they	  did	  not	  need	  the	  video,	  but	  that	  it	  could	  still	  be	  beneficial	  to	  others.	  In	  all	  observed	  cases	  users	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  use	  the	  interface	  without	  help	  from	  the	  video.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  providing	  the	  option	  for	  help	  has	  no	  risks	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  satisfying	  voting	  experience	  for	  some	  users.	  





finger-­‐to-­‐click/pencil-­‐to-­‐type	  paradigm	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  use.	  Finally,	  some	  confusion	  occurred	  when	  the	  “video”	  had	  started.	  	  Had	  the	  experimenters	  been	  more	  clear	  about	  when	  the	  “video”	  actually	  started,	  confusion	  might	  have	  been	  avoided.	  Because	  of	  these	  issues,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  make	  a	  final	  determination	  about	  the	  proposed	  interface,	  but	  so	  far	  all	  results	  are	  promising.	  
Moving	  forward,	  the	  team	  recommends	  that	  the	  following	  steps	  be	  taken:	  
• Further	  iteration	  to	  refine	  proposed	  interface,	  particularly	  Drag	  and	  Drop	  and	  Nominating	  Ballot	  interfaces.	  
• Further	  investigation	  into	  implementing	  Drag	  and	  Drop	  ballots	  with	  a	  mouse	  
• Investigation	  into	  interfaces	  across	  multiple	  device	  types	  and	  web	  browsers	  
• Testing	  with	  faculty	  focus	  groups	  to	  determine	  issues	  with	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  interfaces.	  This	  testing	  should	  involve	  prototype	  interactive	  interfaces	  and	  several	  device	  types	  (smartphones,	  tablets,	  and	  PCs/Laptops).	  







7.	  Conclusion	  After	  careful	  consideration	  of	  relevant	  research	  and	  factors	  unique	  to	  WPI,	  the	  team	  has	  determined	  that	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  faculty	  elections.	  Furthermore,	  the	  team	  has	  concluded	  a	  custom	  solution	  developed	  using	  the	  personnel	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  university	  would	  best	  suit	  the	  needs	  of	  WPI	  Faculty	  Elections.	  Much	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  comes	  from	  the	  difficulty	  of	  finding	  an	  existing	  system	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  supporting	  the	  unique	  vote	  counting	  system	  described	  in	  the	  WPI	  Faculty	  Handbook.	  A	  custom	  designed	  system	  could	  be	  easily	  built	  with	  this	  unique	  system	  in	  mind.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  custom	  system	  holds	  greater	  potential	  for	  faculty	  input	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  development,	  which	  increases	  the	  chances	  of	  easy	  acceptance	  of	  the	  system.	  
If	  a	  student	  project	  were	  used	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  labor	  for	  the	  project,	  development	  costs	  would	  be	  minimal.	  This	  project	  presents	  significant	  educational	  value	  because	  of	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  design	  considerations	  (security,	  usability,	  maintainability,	  etc).	  However,	  there	  is	  significant	  risk	  involved	  with	  using	  a	  student	  project	  to	  produce	  this	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  long-­‐term	  maintainability	  and	  quality	  of	  code.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  the	  team	  has	  identified	  ways	  to	  mitigate	  risk	  in	  deploying	  a	  custom	  voting	  system	  for	  WPI	  faculty	  elections;	  these	  steps	  are	  outlined	  below.	  





These	  elections	  could,	  for	  example,	  ask	  the	  favorite	  color	  of	  faculty	  members	  (or	  some	  equally	  innocuous	  question).	  This	  would	  prevent	  any	  voter	  anxiety	  about	  an	  unfamiliar	  system	  being	  used	  for	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  decision.	  Any	  potential	  system,	  WPI	  built	  or	  otherwise,	  should	  successfully	  be	  run	  through	  one	  or	  more	  non-­‐binding	  test	  elections	  to	  identify	  any	  problems	  before	  official	  deployment.	  These	  experimental	  elections	  should	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  error	  rates	  as	  well	  as	  to	  collect	  more	  subjective	  voter	  satisfaction	  data.	  These	  elections	  will	  also	  uncover	  usability	  issues,	  bugs	  in	  the	  program,	  and	  other	  situations	  that	  designers	  may	  overlook.	  Without	  real	  world	  testing	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  proof	  of	  functionality,	  WPI	  faculty	  may	  be	  skeptical	  of	  the	  software.	  Additionally,	  without	  this	  testing	  disastrous	  software	  problems	  may	  show	  up	  in	  the	  first	  deployment	  of	  the	  system	  and	  do	  irreparable	  damage	  to	  voter	  trust	  in	  the	  software	  (no	  matter	  how	  trivial	  the	  fix).	  Any	  step	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  encourage	  voter	  trust	  in	  the	  system	  is	  beneficial.	  





allows	  voters	  to	  place	  trust	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  system	  they	  may	  not	  understand	  because	  they	  trust	  the	  professionals	  performing	  the	  audit.	  
Any	  voting	  system	  implemented	  for	  faculty	  elections	  should	  be	  built	  to	  last.	  Custom	  software	  solutions	  are	  often	  discovered	  to	  be	  unmaintainable.	  The	  faculty	  should	  not	  adopt	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  if	  the	  WPI	  CCC	  is	  not	  confident	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  maintain	  the	  software	  without	  its	  developers.	  Changing	  the	  voting	  system	  is	  too	  difficult	  to	  do	  frequently.	  An	  MQP	  group	  (or	  other	  on-­‐campus	  development	  team)	  should	  consider	  that	  maintainability,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  both	  instructions	  for	  administration	  and	  documentation	  for	  further	  development,	  will	  make	  or	  break	  the	  acceptance	  of	  their	  system.	  The	  CCC	  should	  be	  consulted	  well	  before	  a	  system	  is	  approved	  for	  use	  in	  faculty	  elections.	  Faculty	  governance	  should	  only	  move	  forward	  with	  changes	  if	  those	  changes	  are	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  both	  beneficial	  and	  lasting.	  





much	  more	  likely	  to	  trust	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  likely	  worth	  retaining	  paper	  notifications	  that	  an	  election	  is	  occurring;	  several	  faculty	  members	  expressed	  concern	  that	  they	  would	  miss	  an	  email	  notification	  to	  vote.	  
As	  has	  been	  stated	  before,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  successfully	  conduct	  elections	  is	  with	  the	  full	  support	  of	  voters.	  The	  easiest	  way	  to	  accomplish	  this	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  that	  provides	  a	  satisfying	  voting	  experience.	  Usability	  is	  the	  most	  critical	  design	  consideration	  because,	  unlike	  with	  other	  software,	  when	  a	  user	  decides	  that	  voting	  software	  is	  too	  hard	  to	  use	  to	  be	  worth	  their	  trouble	  it	  actually	  affects	  all	  the	  other	  users	  (by	  potentially	  changing	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  election).	  Providing	  vote-­‐privacy	  is	  the	  second	  most	  important	  consideration	  in	  building	  voter	  trust	  because	  people	  expect	  their	  votes	  to	  be	  kept	  private.	  Ensuring	  that	  ballots	  cannot	  be	  changed	  after	  they	  have	  been	  submitted	  comes	  next	  in	  importance	  for	  voter	  trust.	  Finally,	  ensuring	  that	  only	  enfranchised	  voters	  can	  vote,	  and	  that	  even	  they	  can	  vote	  only	  once,	  is	  necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  elections	  are	  provably	  legitimate.	  For	  true	  lasting	  trust	  to	  be	  established	  all	  of	  these	  properties	  must	  be	  included	  in	  the	  system,	  but	  the	  priorities	  should	  give	  a	  rough	  idea	  on	  how	  much	  time	  should	  be	  spend	  on	  each	  property.	  A	  system	  built	  with	  security	  in	  mind	  will	  never	  lose	  voter	  trust	  because	  of	  a	  security	  breach,	  and	  good	  design	  will	  allow	  the	  system	  to	  gain	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  trust	  before	  the	  system	  is	  even	  implemented.	  





the	  change	  with	  a	  vote.	  The	  most	  significant	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  MQP	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  political	  issues	  to	  make	  completely	  functional	  software	  a	  total	  waste	  of	  time.	  The	  IQP	  team	  and	  Professor	  Kinicki	  believe	  that	  WPI	  faculty	  are	  ready	  to	  embrace	  electronic	  elections,	  though	  there	  may	  be	  some	  opposition.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  if	  faculty	  support	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  of	  the	  system	  designers	  will	  again	  have	  been	  wasted.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  faculty	  does	  approve	  a	  change	  to	  electronic	  voting,	  an	  MQP	  group	  (or	  other	  group	  of	  developers	  on	  campus)	  will	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  to	  do.	  





7.2.	  Contingencies	  In	  the	  event	  that	  an	  MQP	  is	  not	  possible,	  or	  the	  product	  of	  an	  MQP	  is	  not	  suitable,	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  should	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  finding	  another	  system.	  The	  recommendation	  that	  this	  paper	  provides	  may	  be	  the	  obvious	  way	  forward	  for	  faculty	  governance,	  but	  if	  that	  plan	  fails	  there	  should	  not	  be	  a	  need	  for	  another	  IQP.	  The	  team	  designed	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  they	  could	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  any	  election	  system	  worth	  consideration	  for	  WPI	  faculty	  elections.	  The	  system	  evaluations	  contained	  in	  the	  appendices	  demonstrate	  how	  systems	  can	  easily	  be	  identified	  as	  practical	  or	  not	  in	  this	  context.	  A	  viable	  alternative	  to	  the	  final	  recommendation	  is	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Helios	  software	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  paper.	  Some	  modifications	  to	  this	  open	  source	  software	  could	  make	  it	  a	  very	  good	  option	  for	  WPI	  Faculty	  Governance.	  	  





7.3.	  Notes	  for	  Future	  Implementers	  The	  team	  found	  three	  papers	  which	  are	  extremely	  useful	  to	  election	  designers;	  teams	  implementing	  a	  system	  in	  the	  future	  should	  read	  them	  carefully.	  
• Adida	  2008	  and	  2009	  papers	  on	  the	  Helios	  voting	  system’s	  design	  and	  use.	  Helios	  is	  a	  modern	  voting	  system	  that	  contains	  many	  features	  desirable	  for	  a	  voting	  system	  for	  use	  at	  WPI.	  
• Volkamer’s	  paper	  was	  a	  very	  detailed	  list	  of	  features	  and	  procedural	  details	  that	  can	  dramatically	  increase	  the	  trust	  users	  place	  in	  your	  system	  -­‐	  the	  team	  highly	  recommend	  an	  MQP	  team	  act	  on	  Volkamer’s	  suggestions	  to	  increase	  voter’s	  confidence	  in	  any	  new	  systems.	  
• Consulting	  the	  people	  below	  should	  prove	  extremely	  useful	  to	  election	  designers.	  
• The	  customer	  for	  this	  project	  is	  the	  Committee	  on	  Governance;	  meeting	  with	  them	  early	  in	  the	  project	  and	  keeping	  them	  in	  the	  loop	  for	  major	  milestones	  will	  help	  ensure	  a	  successful	  system	  is	  produced.	  
• Penny	  Rock	  is	  the	  faculty	  governance	  coordinator	  -­‐	  she	  is	  the	  person	  who	  will	  have	  to	  interact	  with	  any	  new	  system	  the	  most,	  and	  making	  things	  convenient	  for	  her	  to	  administer	  and	  use	  is	  very	  important.	  





• It	  would	  be	  best	  to	  work	  with	  Professor	  Matthew	  Ward	  and	  Professor	  David	  Brown	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  when	  designing	  the	  user	  interface.	  They	  are	  experts	  in	  human	  computer	  interaction	  and	  ease	  of	  use	  is	  among	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  project.	  
• Phil	  Deneault,	  the	  WPI	  Information	  Security	  officer,	  should	  be	  brought	  in	  twice	  during	  the	  project	  -­‐	  once	  to	  get	  his	  input	  on	  the	  specification	  and	  once	  to	  have	  him	  test	  the	  final	  product.	  The	  approval	  of	  a	  trusted	  security	  professional	  will	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  increasing	  the	  electorate’s	  trust	  in	  the	  system.	  
• Keep	  the	  CCC	  as	  involved	  in	  the	  project	  as	  they	  would	  like	  to	  be	  -­‐	  they	  will	  ultimately	  have	  to	  maintain	  the	  system,	  and	  so	  should	  have	  input	  on	  how	  it	  is	  built.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  team	  has	  a	  few	  recommendations	  for	  any	  following	  projects.	  
• Emphasize	  good	  documentation	  over	  working	  code.	  A	  partially	  completed	  product	  with	  detailed	  instructions	  is	  far	  more	  useful	  to	  the	  faculty	  than	  an	  unmaintainable	  mess	  that	  the	  CCC	  cannot	  support.	  





• Set	  firm	  dates	  for	  deliverables,	  as	  this	  project	  involves	  many	  components	  which	  must	  be	  completed	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  successful	  system	  -­‐	  missed	  deadlines	  will	  quickly	  snowball	  out	  of	  control.	  
 
 
7.4.	  Final	  Remarks	  The	  current	  system	  for	  faculty	  elections	  at	  WPI	  has	  served	  the	  faculty	  well	  for	  almost	  fifteen	  years,	  but	  the	  benefits	  of	  change	  are	  too	  great	  to	  ignore.	  An	  electronic	  system	  for	  elections	  would	  save	  hundreds	  of	  hours	  of	  time	  for	  election	  organizers,	  it	  would	  save	  paper,	  it	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  access,	  and	  it	  would	  increase	  the	  ease	  of	  casting	  a	  valid	  ballot.	  Each	  of	  these	  advantages	  on	  its	  own	  might	  be	  a	  compelling	  reason	  for	  change,	  but	  the	  potential	  for	  all	  of	  them	  makes	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  system	  seem	  inevitable.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  changing	  faculty	  elections	  will	  be	  easy.	  The	  challenges	  that	  the	  designers	  and	  proponents	  of	  an	  electronic	  election	  system	  will	  face	  are	  great;	  but	  with	  careful	  consideration	  they	  are	  not	  insurmountable.	  The	  path	  to	  electronic	  elections	  is	  paved,	  and	  the	  direction	  to	  go	  is	  forward.	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Appendix	  A.	  Survey	  of	  Faculty	  
Electronic	  Voting	  for	  Faculty	  Elections	  
WPI	  Faculty	  elections	  are	  currently	  conducted	  using	  an	  entirely	  paper	  based	  system	  that	  employs	  intra-­‐campus	  mail	  as	  the	  main	  mechanism	  for	  casting	  ballots.	  With	  the	  knowledge	  and	  support	  of	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Faculty	  John	  Sullivan,	  our	  IQP	  group	  is	  exploring	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  moving	  faculty	  elections	  online.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  survey	  is	  to	  gather	  input	  so	  that	  our	  research	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  respective	  needs	  of	  the	  faculty.	  We	  are	  most	  interested	  in	  finding	  out	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  issue	  are	  most	  important	  to	  you	  and	  becoming	  aware	  of	  any	  concerns	  that	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  our	  report.	  
All	  questions	  in	  this	  survey	  refer	  only	  to	  the	  context	  of	  WPI	  faculty	  elections;	  they	  do	  
not	  refer	  to	  national,	  municipal,	  or	  statewide	  elections.	  
	  
Section	  I:	  Relevant	  Voter	  Background	  
1. How	  much	  do	  faculty	  elections	  matter	  to	  you? 
o Greatly 
o Somewhat 
o Not	  very	  much 
o Not	  at	  all 
2. How	  often	  do	  you	  vote	  in	  faculty	  elections?	   
o Every	  election 
o Most	  elections 
o Some	  elections 
o No	  elections) 





o Every	  election 
o Most	  elections 
o Some	  elections 
o No	  elections 
 
Section	  II:	  Electronic	  versus	  Paper	  Elections	  
Switching	  WPI	  elections	  to	  an	  online	  voting	  infrastructure,	  we	  would	  expect	  it	  to: 
• Make	  it	  more	  convenient	  for	  faculty	  members	  to	  vote	  (possibly	  increasing	  voter	  turnout) 
• Allow	  faculty	  members	  who	  are	  off	  campus	  (e.g.	  at	  a	  project	  center)	  to	  vote	  privately,	  and 
• Greatly	  reduce	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	  election	  results. 	  
 
1. Do	  you	  agree	  that	  online	  voting	  would	  accomplish	  these	  results? 
o Yes,	  and	  I	  find	  them	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  switch.	  
o Yes,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  switch	  because	  of	  these	  results.	  
o No,	  but	  if	  online	  voting	  could	  accomplish	  these	  results	  I	  would	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  switch.	  
o No,	  and	  even	  if	  it	  did	  these	  results	  would	  not	  encourage	  me	  to	  switch.	  
2. Do	  you	  think	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  would	  be	  more,	  less,	  or	  equally	  likely	  to	  keep	  your	  vote	  private	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  voting	  system?	   
o More 
o Less 
o Equally	  Likely 
3. Do	  you	  think	  an	  electronic	  system	  would	  be	  more,	  less,	  or	  equally	  susceptible	  to	  tampering	  (malicious	  manipulation	  of	  the	  election	  process)	  than	  the	  current	  voting	  system? 
o More 
o Less 
o Equally	  Likely 
4. How	  easy	  to	  use	  do	  you	  think	  an	  electronic	  system	  would	  be?	  	  Easier,	  	  harder,	  or	  the	  same	  as	  the	  existing	  system? 
o Easier 
o Harder 





Section	  III:	  Potential	  Concerns	  and	  Advantages	  around	  Electronic	  
Voting	  
1. How	  do	  you	  feel	  about	  moving	  faculty	  elections	  to	  an	  electronic	  system? 
o Strongly	  Support 
o Support 
o No	  Opinion 
o Oppose 
o Strongly	  Oppose 
2. What	  features	  would	  you	  most	  like	  to	  see	  in	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system?	  	  (Checkboxes) 
o Ability	  to	  verify	  that	  your	  vote	  was	  counted	  correctly	  while	  maintaining	  privacy. 
o Requiring	  proof	  of	  identity	  in	  addition	  to	  WPI	  username	  and	  password	  when	  voting	  (Two	  Factor	  Authentication	  such	  as	  WPI	  ID	  number). 
o Additional	  Features:	  	  <Optional	  Text	  Box	  for	  Additional	  Features> 
3. What	  concerns,	  if	  any,	  do	  you	  have	  about	  conducting	  faculty	  elections	  electronically 
o The	  ability	  of	  a	  voter	  to	  vote	  multiple	  times 
o The	  public	  record	  of	  who	  has	  voted 
o Some	  voting	  systems	  feature	  safeguards	  to	  prevent	  would-­‐be	  manipulators	  from	  coercing	  voters	  into	  voting	  in	  a	  specific	  way.	  Are	  you	  concerned	  about	  voter	  coercion	  in	  faculty	  elections? 
o Other	  concerns:	  	  <Optional	  Text	  Box	  for	  Additional	  Concerns> 
4. Would	  you	  be	  more,	  less,	  or	  equally	  inclined	  to	  vote	  using	  an	  electronic	  system?	   
o More 
o Less 
o Equally	  likely 
5. Is	  there	  any	  circumstance	  or	  situation	  under	  which	  you	  would	  
not	  vote	  electronically?	  (Text-­‐box) 
6. Similarly,	  are	  there	  any	  circumstances	  where	  you	  would	  prefer	  to	  vote	  electronically?	  (Text-­‐box) 
 
Section	  IV:	  Optional	  Information	  










Appendix	  B.	  Faculty	  Interview	  Questions	  Just	  like	  in	  the	  survey	  there	  were	  no	  forced	  responses.	  It	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  interviewee	  could	  always	  choose	  to	  not	  answer	  a	  question.	  The	  bulleted	  questions	  represent	  follow-­‐up	  questions.	  Individual	  interviews	  followed	  the	  flow	  of	  discussion;	  if	  it	  made	  more	  sense	  to	  ask	  questions	  in	  a	  different	  order,	  it	  was	  done	  so.	  If	  at	  all	  possible,	  all	  questions	  were	  asked.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  pairs.	  One	  member	  of	  the	  interview	  team	  took	  detailed	  notes	  while	  the	  other	  performed	  the	  interview.	  
	  
Questions:	  
• What	  do	  you	  like	  about	  the	  current	  voting	  system?	   	  
o Do	  you	  think	  this	  would	  stay	  the	  same	  in	  a	  move	  to	  an	  electronic	  system?	  	  
• What	  don’t	  you	  like	  about	  the	  current	  voting	  system?	  
o Do	  you	  think	  this	  could	  be	  fixed	  by	  a	  move	  to	  an	  electronic	  system?	  	  
• Has	  there	  been	  a	  time	  you	  did	  not	  vote	  because	  the	  system	  was	  too	  inconvenient?	  
o If	  so,	  can	  you	  tell	  us	  why	  it	  was	  inconvenient?	  
o Do	  you	  believe	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  could	  prevent	  this	  from	  occurring	  again?	  	  
• What	  advantages	  do	  you	  see	  to	  moving	  faculty	  elections	  to	  an	  electronic	  system?	  
o Do	  you	  find	  these	  advantages	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  switch,	  and	  Why?	  
§ (If	  no:)	  What	  would	  convince	  you	  of	  the	  merit	  of	  an	  electronic	  system?	  	  
• Have	  you	  ever	  used	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  before?	  
o (If	  so:)	  What	  was	  your	  experience	  with	  it?	  
§ Are	  there	  things	  you	  wish	  that	  system	  could	  have	  done	  better?	  	  
• What	  concerns	  do	  you	  have	  about	  moving	  faculty	  elections	  to	  an	  electronic	  system?	  





o Are	  there	  a	  set	  of	  circumstances	  where	  you	  would	  not	  want	  to	  use	  an	  electronic	  voting	  system	  to	  vote?	  
o How	  could	  the	  designers	  of	  the	  system	  help	  to	  mitigate	  these	  concerns?	  	  
• An	  example	  of	  a	  concern	  we	  received	  through	  the	  survey	  was	  losing	  important	  election	  emails	  among	  the	  many	  received	  daily.	  
o Do	  you	  share	  this	  concern?	  
o Do	  you	  believe	  having	  a	  paper	  reminder	  as	  well	  would	  mitigate	  this	  concern?	  	  
• Do	  you	  feel	  voter-­‐coercion	  is	  a	  concern	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  elections?	  
o Our	  research	  suggests	  it	  is	  that	  is	  a	  bigger	  issue	  in	  smaller	  elections	  than	  many	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  (Endo	  et.	  al.,	  1287)	  
o (If	  you	  do	  not	  mind	  telling	  us)	  In	  your	  experience,	  does	  voter	  coercion	  occur	  in	  WPI	  Faculty	  Elections?	  	  
• Are	  there	  any	  specific	  features	  you	  would	  like	  to	  see	  in	  a	  new	  voting	  system?	  
o Are	  there	  any	  features	  that	  would	  make	  the	  system	  easier	  for	  you	  to	  use?	  
o Are	  there	  any	  features	  you	  consider	  critical	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  system?	  
o Would	  these	  features	  make	  you	  more	  likely	  to	  support/use	  the	  new	  system?	  





Appendix	  C-­‐0.	  Scorecard	  for	  System	  Evaluation	  
Required	  







S:	  The	  system	  takes	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  prevent	  any	  voter	  from	  casting	  a	  second	  vote.	   	   	   	   U:	  The	  user	  is	  able	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  without	  extensive	  training.	   	   	   	   I:	  The	  system	  must	  count	  votes	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  method	  described	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  handbook.	  This	  includes	  support	  for	  recounts.	   	   	   	   I:	  The	  team	  finds	  the	  cost	  of	  implementing	  and	  maintaining	  the	  system	  and	  running	  an	  election	  acceptable.	   	   	   	   	  

































U:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	   	   	   	   U:	  The	  system	  provides	  an	  interface	  that	  is	  usable	  for	  voting	  on	  smartphones	  and/or	  tablets.	   	   	   	   I:	  The	  system	  can	  perform	  an	  electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	   	   	   	   I:	  Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  available	  by	  the	  producing	  company	  or	  a	  third	  party.	   	   	   	   





Appendix	  C-­‐1.	  Current	  System	  Evaluation	  
Required	  















X	   While	  any	  voter	  may	  photocopy	  their	  ballot,	  custom-­‐printed	  envelopes	  are	  required	  for	  ballot	  submission,	  which	  should	  prevent	  the	  submission	  of	  more	  than	  1	  ballot.	  	  










X	   The	  Secretary	  for	  Faculty	  Governance	  is	  responsible	  for	  counting	  ballots,	  and	  uses	  this	  system	  to	  do	  so.	  





X	   The	  cost	  of	  the	  current	  election	  is	  minimal	  monetarily,	  but	  consumes	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  time	  for	  those	  responsible	  for	  counting	  the	  votes.	  	  	  











X	   The	  current	  system	  is	  described	  completely	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  handbook.	  





X	   The	  WPI	  Faculty	  Handbook	  summarizes	  the	  current	  system.	  





X	   This	  is	  the	  current	  system,	  and	  by	  definition	  cannot	  take	  longer	  than	  itself.	  





X	   No	  computers	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  process.	  





entities	  that	  the	  faculty	  already	  trusts	  to	  be	  secure	  (e.g.	  the	  WPI	  Central	  Authentication	  System).	  
  and	  intra-­‐campus	  mail.	  
U:	  The	  system	  contains	  effective	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  voter	  from	  accidentally	  recording	  under-­‐votes	  (absence	  of	  a	  candidate	  vote)	  and	  over-­‐votes	  (voting	  for	  multiple	  candidates	  in	  the	  same	  election).	  




There	  are	  no	  measures	  to	  ensure	  a	  ballot	  is	  filled	  in	  correctly,	  leading	  may	  lead	  to	  incorrect	  ballot	  submission.	  





X	   The	  description	  in	  the	  handbook	  documents	  the	  complete	  process,	  though	  a	  number	  of	  rules	  (e.g.	  on	  nomination,	  and	  breaking	  ties)	  have	  been	  decided	  separately	  by	  the	  Committee	  on	  Governance.	  U:	  The	  voting	  interface	  clearly	  depicts	  to	  the	  user	  which	  candidates	  their	  vote	  will	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  mis-­‐voting.	  




There	  is	  no	  confirmation	  that	  a	  ballot	  has	  been	  filled	  in,	  and	  that	  it	  has	  been	  filled	  in	  correctly.	  	  	  











X	   No	  receipt	  of	  voting	  is	  given.	  
T:	  The	  system	  provides	  a	  way	  for	  voters	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (individual	  verifiability).	  




No	  provision	  is	  made	  for	  this.	  
The	  system	  enables	  voters	  to	  independently	  verify	  that	  all	  votes	  were	  	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (universal	  verifiability).	  




No	  provision	  is	  made	  for	  this.	  





X	   Nothing	  beyond	  the	  ballot	  is	  required	  to	  vote.	  
U:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	  









I:	  The	  system	  can	  perform	  an	  electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	  




All	  counting	  is	  manual.	  
I:	  Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  available	  by	  the	  producing	  company	  or	  a	  third	  party.	   X	   	   	   All	  support	  for	  the	  election	  is	  in-­‐house.	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  





Appendix	  C-­‐2.	  Helios	  Evaluation	  
Required	  





X	   Provision	  is	  made	  for	  the	  authentication	  of	  voters	  through	  several	  means.	  
S:	  No	  person	  is	  easily	  able	  to	  gain	  identifiable	  information	  from	  the	  system	  about	  another	  person’s	  vote.	  This	  includes	  WPI	  System	  Administrators	  and	  Election	  Officials;	  while	  a	  user	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  see	  other	  votes,	  they	  cannot	  determine	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  casting	  them	  




Ballot	  storage	  in	  Helios	  relies	  on	  the	  security	  of	  the	  database.	  Strong	  encryption	  guarantees	  the	  security	  of	  votes	  while	  they	  are	  being	  cast	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  server.	  That	  being	  said,	  those	  with	  access	  to	  the	  server	  could	  gain	  information	  on	  voters.	  	  





X	   The	  Helios	  method	  is	  interesting	  in	  that	  anyone	  may	  submit	  any	  number	  of	  votes,	  but	  only	  the	  last	  one	  submitted	  is	  the	  only	  one	  counted	  -­‐	  effectively,	  only	  one	  vote	  is	  cast.	  U:	  The	  user	  is	  able	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  without	  extensive	  training.	   	   	   X	   The	  voting	  process	  is	  quite	  simple.	  	  





method	  described	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  handbook.	  This	  includes	  support	  for	  recounts.	  
elections,	  but	  could	  support	  the	  current	  WPI	  system	  with	  (potentially	  extensive)	  modifications	  	  





X	   Helios	  is	  open	  source,	  free	  software.	  It	  might	  require	  extensive	  modification	  time,	  however.	  	  	  	  











X	   Source	  code	  is	  licensed	  under	  the	  GNU	  GPL,	  and	  technical	  papers	  on	  the	  system	  are	  available.	  	  
 
S:	  The	  system	  limits	  its	  trust	  in	  the	  physical	  security	  of	  voter	  owned	  hardware.	   	   	   X	   Votes	  are	  encrypted	  on	  the	  client’s	  machine,	  and	  the	  unencrypted	  results	  are	  removed	  from	  memory.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  timeout	  on	  voting	  -­‐	  this	  could	  be	  added	  easily,	  though.	  	  





X	   Such	  a	  summary	  is	  available	  on	  the	  Helios	  website.	  	  
 
U:	  For	  a	  voter	  experienced	  with	  both	  the	  current	  and	  proposed	  system,	  casting	  a	  ballot	  does	  not	  take	  more	  time	  than	  the	  current	  system.	  




The	  submission	  process	  includes	  verification	  of	  the	  voter’s	  selections	  and	  an	  encryption	  process,	  which	  lengthen	  the	  process.	  	  





install	  any	  new	  software	  on	  their	  personal	  computer	  beyond	  a	  supported	  web	  browser	  in	  order	  to	  vote.	  
  browser	  is	  required	  to	  vote.	  	  





X	   Helios	  supports	  OAuth,	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  WPI	  Central	  Authentication	  System.	  	  
 U:	  The	  system	  contains	  effective	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  voter	  from	  accidentally	  recording	  under-­‐votes	  (absence	  of	  a	  candidate	  vote)	  and	  over-­‐votes	  (voting	  for	  multiple	  candidates	  in	  the	  same	  election).	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 
The	  current	  implementation	  does	  not	  match	  WPI’s	  vote	  optional	  criteria,	  but	  could	  be	  easily	  modified	  to	  do	  so.	  
I:	  Complete	  technical	  documentation	  for	  deployment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  









X	   Before	  encrypting	  their	  ballot,	  the	  voter	  is	  prompted	  to	  confirm	  who	  they	  wish	  to	  vote	  for.	  	  	  


























X	   Nothing	  beyond	  the	  voter’s	  WPI	  login	  would	  be	  required.	  
U:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 





smartphones	  and/or	  tablets.	   need	  to	  be	  developed.	  I:	  The	  system	  can	  perform	  an	  electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 
Could	  be	  added,	  but	  presently	  no	  provision	  is	  made.	  
I:	  Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  available	  by	  the	  producing	  company	  or	  a	  third	  party.	   X	   	   	   No	  third	  party	  support	  is	  available	  for	  the	  system	  	  





Appendix	  C-­‐3.	  Scantegrity	  Evaluation	  
Required	  
Criteria	   Not	  Satisfied	   Satisfied	  after	  changes	   Satisfied	   Notes	  S:	  The	  system	  verifies	  the	  voter's	  identity	  and	  eligibility	  before	  a	  ballot	  is	  distributed	  or	  submitted.	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 





X	   Ballots	  contain	  no	  identifiable	  information	  beyond	  a	  serial	  number	  












Insufficient	  data.	  A	  custom	  ballot-­‐counting	  machine	  and	  annual	  purchase	  of	  ballots	  would	  be	  required,	  cost	  unknown.	  Consultation	  with	  Scantegrity	  required.	  	  	  	  











X	   Source	  code	  and	  technical	  documentation	  are	  both	  freely	  available.	  





X	   Description	  is	  available	  on	  Scantegrity’s	  website.	  
U:	  For	  a	  voter	  experienced	  with	  both	  the	  current	  and	  proposed	  system,	  casting	  a	  ballot	  does	  not	  take	  more	  time	  than	  the	  current	  system.	  




Completion	  of	  a	  ballot	  with	  the	  additional	  step	  of	  recording	  voting	  codes	  is	  more	  time-­‐consuming	  than	  the	  current	  system	  










(e.g.	  the	  WPI	  Central	  Authentication	  System).	   campus	  mail	  and	  WPI	  IDs	  to	  authenticate	  users.	  U:	  The	  system	  contains	  effective	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  voter	  from	  accidentally	  recording	  under-­‐votes	  (absence	  of	  a	  candidate	  vote)	  and	  over-­‐votes	  (voting	  for	  multiple	  candidates	  in	  the	  same	  election).	  




The	  voter	  is	  not	  notified	  if	  their	  ballot	  is	  incorrect	  or	  incomplete.	  This	  is	  inherent	  to	  the	  system	  and	  cannot	  be	  changed.	  
I:	  Complete	  technical	  documentation	  for	  deployment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 
Such	  documentation	  is	  not	  publicly	  available.	  However,	  it	  is	  presumably	  available	  from	  Scantegrity	  upon	  purchase	  of	  the	  system.	  This	  information	  could	  then	  be	  made	  available	  to	  voters.	  U:	  The	  voting	  interface	  clearly	  depicts	  to	  the	  user	  which	  candidates	  their	  vote	  will	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  mis-­‐voting.	  




No	  reminder	  of	  candidates	  being	  voted	  for	  is	  built	  into	  the	  system.	  This	  is	  not	  possible	  in	  paper	  systems.	  	  	  
















X	   Confirmation	  codes	  permit	  voters	  to	  confirm	  their	  vote	  was	  correctly	  recorded.	  





X	   All	  steps	  performed	  to	  obtain	  the	  final	  winner	  can	  be	  independently	  reproduced	  to	  verify	  the	  result.	  T:	  The	  system	  enables	  one	  to	  change	  one's	  vote	  after	  it	  is	  first	  cast	  (vote-­‐updating).	   X	   	   	   No	  provision	  is	  made	  for	  this.	  It	  would	  be	  nontrivial	  to	  add.	  U:	  The	  system	  does	  not	  require	  the	  voter	  to	  remember	  information	  (e.g.	  codes)	  or	  carry	  a	  physical	  item	  in	  addition	  to	  what	  he	  or	  she	  already	  carries/remembers	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  a	  WPI	  faculty	  member.	  




A	  vote	  receipt	  must	  be	  retained	  to	  audit	  one’s	  vote,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  for	  simply	  casting	  a	  ballot.	  However,	  a	  special	  pen	  is	  required	  to	  place	  a	  vote.	  U:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	  














X	   As	  long	  as	  the	  special	  voting	  pen	  is	  present,	  voting	  can	  be	  conducted	  anywhere.	  I:	  The	  system	  can	  perform	  an	  electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	  











Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  presumably	  available	  from	  Scantegrity,	  but	  details	  are	  not	  publicly	  available.	  	  





Appendix	  C-­‐4.	  EBallot	  Evaluation	  
Required	  





X	   Authentication	  is	  natively	  supported.	  





X	   Ballots	  can	  be	  anonymous,	  or	  not	  anonymous,	  set	  at	  time	  of	  election	  creation.	  





X	   Yes,	  such	  measures	  are	  taken.	  












Insufficient	  information	  to	  determine.	  Cost	  is	  likely	  high,	  but	  exact	  details	  are	  only	  available	  via	  consultation	  	  	  






Criteria	   Not	  Satisfied	   Satisfied	  after	  changes	   Satisfied	   Notes	  T:	  Complete	  source	  code	  and	  technical	  specifications	  for	  the	  system	  are	  freely	  available.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  provide	  any	  voter	  or	  researcher	  who	  asks	  all	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  construct	  an	  exact	  replica	  of	  the	  system.	  




No,	  closed-­‐source	  and	  cloud-­‐hosted	  product.	  





X	   Yes,	  marketing	  material	  is	  available	  on	  the	  product’s	  website.	  










X	   Only	  requires	  a	  supported	  browser	  
S:	  The	  system	  leverages	  other	  entities	  that	  the	  faculty	  already	  trusts	  to	  be	  secure	  (e.g.	  the	  WPI	  Central	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 












No	  information	  available	  on	  this	  part	  of	  the	  voting	  process	  
I:	  Complete	  technical	  documentation	  for	  deployment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  




No,	  cloud	  hosted	  system	  -­‐	  documentation	  neither	  available	  nor	  required.	  







No	  information	  available	  on	  this	  part	  of	  the	  voting	  process	  
	  	  






Criteria	   Not	  Satisfied	   Satisfied	  after	  changes	   Satisfied	   Notes	  S:	  The	  system	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  voter	  any	  information	  which	  he	  or	  she	  could	  use	  to	  prove	  his	  or	  her	  vote	  to	  an	  attacker	  (i.e.	  the	  voter	  receives	  no	  receipt).	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 
Receipts	  are	  distributed	  by	  default,	  but	  it	  would	  likely	  be	  trivial	  for	  the	  company	  to	  disable	  them.	  T:	  The	  system	  provides	  a	  way	  for	  voters	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (individual	  verifiability).	  





The	  system	  enables	  voters	  to	  independently	  verify	  that	  all	  votes	  were	  	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (universal	  verifiability).	  










X	   Administrators	  need	  a	  code	  to	  perform	  administrative	  actions,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  required	  of	  ordinary	  voters	  
U:	  The	  system	  uses	  a	  proven	  method	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  alphabetic	  voting	  on	  the	  election	  outcome.	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 





interface	  that	  is	  usable	  for	  voting	  on	  smartphones	  and/or	  tablets.	     I:	  The	  system	  can	  perform	  an	  electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	  




No,	  no	  provision	  










Appendix	  C-­‐5.	  SurveyMonkey	  Evaluation	  
Required	  










X	   SurveyMonkey	  is	  an	  anonymous	  survey	  system	  
S:	  The	  system	  takes	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  prevent	  any	  voter	  from	  casting	  a	  second	  vote.	   	   	   X	   SurveyMonkey	  has	  provisions	  to	  prevent	  one	  computer	  from	  voting	  twice.	  It	  is	  unknown	  whether	  this	  will	  prevent	  users	  from	  voting	  twice	  on	  different	  computers,	  however.	  U:	  The	  user	  is	  able	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  without	  extensive	  training.	   	   	   X	   Simple,	  standard	  survey	  system	  which	  is	  commonly	  used	  at	  WPI.	  I:	  The	  system	  must	  count	  votes	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  method	  described	  in	  the	  WPI	  faculty	  handbook.	  This	  includes	  
	  
 
X	   	  
 










X	   Professional	  version	  of	  system	  is	  very	  affordable,	  priced	  so	  individuals	  can	  purchase.	  
Strongly	  Recommended	  
Criteria	   Not	  Satisfied	   Satisfied	  after	  changes	   Satisfied	   Notes	  T:	  Complete	  source	  code	  and	  technical	  specifications	  for	  the	  system	  are	  freely	  available.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  provide	  any	  voter	  or	  researcher	  who	  asks	  all	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  construct	  an	  exact	  replica	  of	  the	  system.	  




Closed	  source,	  cloud	  hosted	  system	  





X	   Very	  commonly	  used	  and	  documented	  systems	  















X	   No	  additional	  software	  required	  





X	   CAS	  integration	  could	  potentially	  be	  achieved	  as	  both	  systems	  support	  OAuth,	  but	  this	  is	  untested	  at	  this	  time.	  U:	  The	  system	  contains	  effective	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  voter	  from	  accidentally	  recording	  under-­‐votes	  (absence	  of	  a	  candidate	  vote)	  and	  over-­‐votes	  (voting	  for	  multiple	  candidates	  in	  the	  same	  election).	  




SurveyMonkey	  was	  designed	  for	  surveys,	  where	  no	  response	  or	  an	  incomplete	  response	  is	  perfectly	  acceptable,	  and	  consequently	  does	  not	  notify	  on	  these	  situations.	  
I:	  Complete	  technical	  documentation	  for	  deployment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  available.	  




Neither	  available	  nor	  required,	  given	  this	  system	  is	  cloud-­‐hosted	  
U:	  The	  voting	  interface	  clearly	  depicts	  to	  the	  user	  which	  candidates	  their	  vote	  will	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  mis-­‐voting.	  




No	  provision,	  surveys	  are	  meant	  to	  gauge	  opinion	  in	  most	  cases.	  
	  	  











X	   No	  receipt	  is	  distributed	  as	  surveys	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  anonymous	  
T:	  The	  system	  provides	  a	  way	  for	  voters	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  vote	  was	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (individual	  verifiability).	  





The	  system	  enables	  voters	  to	  independently	  verify	  that	  all	  votes	  were	  	  recorded	  and	  counted	  correctly	  (universal	  verifiability).	  










X	   No	  additional	  authentication	  requirements.	  










electronic	  recount	  of	  an	  election	  if	  a	  candidate	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  election.	     counting,	  nevermind	  recounting.	  I:	  Technical	  support	  for	  the	  system	  is	  available	  by	  the	  producing	  company	  or	  a	  third	  party.	   	   	   X	   Technical	  support	  is	  available	  from	  the	  producing	  company.	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
